FROM CAMPBELL CIRCUIT COURT HONORABLE FRED A. STINE, V, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 15-CR-00900
FOR APPELLANT: Brandon N. Voelker Fort Mitchell, Kentucky
FOR APPELLEE: Andy Beshear Attorney General of Kentucky Jesse
L. Robbins Assistant Attorney General Frankfort, Kentucky
BEFORE: COMBS, JOHNSON, AND J. LAMBERT, JUDGES.
LAMBERT, J., JUDGE.
Jackson has directly appealed from the Final Judgment of the
Campbell Circuit Court convicting him of driving on a
DUI-suspended license, third offense aggravator, following a
bench trial, and sentencing him to twelve months in jail.
Jackson contests the circuit court's denial of his
pre-trial motion to dismiss that charge. Finding no error, we
facts in this case are largely uncontested, and we shall only
briefly recount them. After fishing on his mother's
private property in Campbell County, Jackson flipped his
truck while driving on her property and injured himself. His
mother called 911 to report the accident and that he had been
drinking. Responding officers noticed that Jackson smelled
strongly of alcohol, but he refused to give a blood sample.
Emergency workers transported Jackson to the hospital so that
he could receive necessary medical treatment. Officers
obtained the results of a blood draw while he was
result, the Campbell County grand jury indicted Jackson on
two charges. Count 1 charged that he was operating a motor
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol/drugs, fourth
offense, pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS)
189A.010(5). Count 2 charged that he was driving on a DUI
suspended license, second offense, aggravator, while he was
under the influence of alcohol or drugs pursuant to KRS
189A.090(2). Jackson entered a not guilty plea at his
arraignment, and he was placed on home incarceration. The
condition of home incarceration was later removed from his
to trial, Jackson moved to suppress any evidence the officers
discovered based on lack of consent to enter the property and
lack of a warrant, as well as the blood test results based
upon lack of consent and an alleged HIPAA violation. The
Commonwealth objected to the motion, and the court held a
hearing. The court ultimately denied the motion to suppress,
setting forth the factual circumstances and its legal
conclusions on the issues. None of the issues raised in the
motion to suppress is before this Court on appeal.
on information discovered at the suppression hearing, Jackson
moved to dismiss Count 2 of the indictment, the driving on a
DUI suspended license charge. Jackson argued that KRS
186.620(2) prohibits a person from operating a motor vehicle
on a highway without a license. Because he had been driving
on private property belonging to his mother and stepfather,
he was not required to have a license and therefore could not
have committed the offense for which he was charged. The
Commonwealth objected to the motion, arguing that a criminal
proceeding may not be dismissed without the consent of the
presiding judge and the Commonwealth, and because Jackson had
been charged with a violation of KRS 189A.090, not KRS
186.620. Jackson also filed a motion in limine to
exclude evidence of his prior DUI convictions or other
charges. The circuit court denied both motions by order
entered August 16, 2016, noting that it did not have the
authority to dismiss the indictment. The following day,
Jackson moved the court to exclude any evidence of driving on
a private property for purposes of a need for a driver's
license, making the same argument he did in the motion to
court held a bench trial on August 17, 2016,  and Jackson
renewed his previously filed motions at the close of the
Commonwealth's case. The court found Jackson not guilty
under Count 1 and dismissed that charge, and it found him
guilty of Count 2. In its Final Judgment entered September
14, 2016, the court sentenced Jackson to twelve months in the
Campbell County Detention Center. This appeal now follows.
appeal, Jackson's sole argument is that the circuit court
erred in denying his motion to dismiss based upon the
application of KRS 186.620. Because this necessarily requires
us to interpret that statute in relation to KRS 189A.090, and
statutory interpretation is a question of law, we shall
review this matter de novo. Commonwealth v.
Gamble, 453 S.W.3d 716, 718 (Ky. 2015); Cinelli v.
Ward, 997 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Ky. App. 1998).
Kentucky, "[t]he primary purpose of judicial
construction is to carry out the intent of the legislature.
In construing a statute, the courts must consider the
intended purpose of the statute-and the mischief intended to
be remedied. A court may not interpret a statute at variance
with its stated language." Monumental Life Ins. Co.
v. Dept. of Revenue, 294 S.W.3d 10, 19 (Ky. App. 2008)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citing SmithKline
Beecham Corp. v. Revenue Cabinet, 40 S.W.3d 883, 885
(Ky. App. 2001)). "The courts should reject a
construction that is unreasonable and absurd, in preference
for one that is reasonable, rational, sensible and
intelligent[.]" Monumental Life Ins. Co., 294
S.W.3d at 19 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing
Commonwealth v. Kerr, 136 S.W.3d 783, 785 (Ky. App.
2004)); Commonwealth v. Kash, 967 S.W.2d 37, 43-44
(Ky. App. 1997). "[T]he courts have a duty to accord
statutory language its literal meaning unless to do so would
lead to an absurd or wholly unreasonable result."
Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 308 S.W.3d 720, 723 (Ky.
App. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Holbrook v. Kentucky Unemployment Ins.
Comm'n, 290 S.W.3d 81, 86 (Ky. App. 2009)).
"[S]tatutes must be given their literal interpretation
unless they are ambiguous and if the words are not ambiguous,
no statutory construction is required. We lend words of a
statute their normal, ordinary, everyday meaning."
Stephenson v. Woodward, 182 S.W.3d 162, 170 (Ky.
2005) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Plowman, 86 S.W.3d 47, 49
was charged with operating a motor vehicle while his license
was DUI-suspended under KRS 189A.090, which ...