United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Paducah Division
B. RUSSELL, SENIOR JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
preliminary consideration under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing
Section 2255 Cases in the United States District Courts, the
Court ordered Defendant/Movant Lydell Devon Staples to show
cause why his pro se motion to vacate, set aside, or
correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (DN
40) should not be denied and his action dismissed as
untimely. The 30-day period in which to respond has expired
with no response by Staples.
March 6, 2013, the Judgment and Commitment Order (DN 27) was
entered after Staples pleaded guilty to distribution of
cocaine base (count 1) and distribution of marijuana (count
2). He was sentenced to 151 months in prison on count 1 and
60 months on count 2 to be served concurrently for a total
term of 151 months. Staples did not appeal. He filed the
instant § 2255 motion on June 20, 2017.
2255 provides for a one-year limitations period, which shall
run from the latest of:
(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion
created by governmental action in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the
movant was prevented from making a motion by such
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly
recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively
applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the
exercise of due diligence.
Court explained in its prior Memorandum and Order (DN 41),
the judgment became final on March 20, 2013, upon the
expiration of the fourteen-day period for filing a notice of
appeal. The one-year statute of limitations therefore ran on
March 20, 2014, and Staple's § 2255 motion was filed
over three years after the statute of limitations expired.
§ 2255 motion indicated that Staples believed that his
motion is timely because it was filed within one year of
Mathis v. United States, U.S., 136 S.Ct. 2243
(2016). However, the Supreme Court's decision in
Mathis did not create a new rule of law applying
retroactively to cases on collateral review, and thus the
one-year period set forth in § 2255(f)(3) was not
triggered. See In re Lott, 838 F.3d 522, 523 (5th
Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (finding that inmate “failed to
make a prima facie showing that Mathis . . . set
forth new rules of constitutional law that have been made
retroactive to cases on collateral review”); United
States v. Taylor, 672 F.App'x 860, 864 (10th Cir.
2016) (holding that “Mathis did not announce a
new rule”); Brodie v. United States, No.
5:12CR-13-TBR, 2017 WL 2540570, at *2 (W.D. Ky. June 9, 2017)
(“[T]he Supreme Court's decision in Mathis
did not create a new rule of law which applies retroactively
to cases on collateral review.”); Atkinson v.
United States, No. 1:16-cv-67, 2017 WL 1227876, at *2
(W.D. Mich. Apr. 4, 2017) (finding that
“Mathis did not announce a new constitutional
§ 2255's one-year statute of limitations is not
jurisdictional, it is subject to equitable tolling.
Dunlap v. United States, 250 F.3d 1001, 1007 (6th
Cir. 2001). Therefore, before dismissing the motion as
time-barred, the Court provided Staples with an opportunity
to show whether equitable ...