United States District Court, E.D. Kentucky, Southern Division, Pikeville
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
matter is before the Court on Gravley's Motion for
Exculpatory Information Pertaining to Investigation. [R.
380.] The Government has responded and briefing is complete.
following reasons, Mr. Gravley's motion is DENIED.
January 20, 2011, while an inmate at USP Big Sandy, Dwaune
Gravley was charged with one count of first degree murder in
violation is of 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a) and (b); one count
of conspiracy to commit murder in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1117; and four additional counts relating to the
murder of fellow inmate Shamoni Peterson. [R. 190.] He was
found guilty by a jury on all counts on April 1, 2011. [R.
297.] He was sentenced to life in prison on September 8,
2011. [R. 329.]
appealed to the Sixth Circuit and the judgment of this Court
was upheld on October 15, 2014. [R. 379.] On April 1, 2013,
Gravley filed his first Motion to Vacate pursuant to §
2255 and filed a supplemental § 2255 on February 1,
2016. [R. 364; R. 387.] He has also filed the instant motion,
requesting exculpatory information. [R. 380.]
motion for exculpatory information, Gravley asks for
“exculpatory information pertaining to investigation
into allegations Paul Allan Woods III made to United States
Attorney(s) that Mr. Gravley was planning to murder inmate
‘Andre Player.'” [R. 380 at 1.] Gravley
requests various pieces of exculpatory information,
depositions, “institutional investigation reports,
” United States Marshall's investigation report,
” “name of the United States Marshall Paul
Wood” spoke to regarding the incident in question,
“a copy of all the inmate's names and numbers who
were allegedly on the air plane the day in question, ”
“transfer orders signed by warden” for inmates
transported together, and “email sent by AUSA Mr. Pat
Malloy (or letter sent) to Paul Woods' prosecuting
attorney requesting woods receive a sentence
reduction.” [R. 380 at 1.]
is requesting no new exculpatory information, but is merely
making the same arguments he has made repeatedly in his
Motion for a New Trial [R. 341]; his habeas petition [R.
364]; before the Sixth Circuit [see R. 379]; his
supplemental habeas petition [R. 387]; and his objections to
Magistrate Judge Atkins's Recommended Disposition [R.
399]. Namely, he alleges that Woods perjured himself in
numerous ways and the Government has not submitted proof of
such perjury. The Court construes this as a Brady
process clause requires the government to disclose favorable
evidence to the defendant. Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83 (1963). In Brady, the Supreme Court held
that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process
where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution.” Id. at 87. In order to show a
Brady violation, Gravley must prove that (1) evidence was
favorable to him, because it was either exculpatory or
impeaching, (2) the government suppressed the evidence,
either willfully or inadvertently, and (3) he was prejudiced
by the nondisclosure. Stickler v. Greene, 119 S.Ct.
1936, 1948 (1999). Brady “is concerned only with cases
in which the government possesses information which the
defendant does not, and the government's failure to
disclose the information deprives the defendant of a fair
trial.” United States v. Mullins, 22 F.3d
1365, 1371 (6th Cir. 1994). A defendant is prejudiced when
there is “a reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” Kyles v.
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433-34 (1995) (quoting United
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)).
order to assert a valid Brady claim, then, Gravley
must prove that, had he possessed the information he is now
seeking from the Government, the result of his proceeding
would have been different. Woods's testimony had to be so
crucial to the Government's case that, had Gravley been
able to impeach him more fully, he would have been acquitted
of all charges. This Court has already considered and
dismissed that possibility:
Here, because other witnesses corroborated Woods'
testimony and because the government offered other evidence
of Gravley's guilt, Woods was not a crucial government
witness. The government called witnesses who either witnessed
the crimes charged or claimed to have heard Gravley confess.
There was also significant circumstantial evidence introduced
to support the verdict (i.e. medical testimony from the
pathologist, evidence that Gravley had the authority to order
Milburne to commit the murder, evidence that Peterson had
spoken ill of the gang with which Gravley and Milburne are
affiliated, etc.). Thus, there is not a “reasonable
probability” that, had the evidence been introduced,
the verdict would have been different.
[R. 316 at 10.] The Sixth Circuit affirmed this reasoning,
holding, “Woods's perjury, while useful as
impeachment evidence, was not likely material nor likely to
have produced Gravley's acquittal for at least two
reasons: (1) other witnesses corroborated Woods's
testimony; and (2) the Government offered other evidence of
Gravley's guilt.” [R. 379 at 25.] Gravley was not
prejudiced by the alleged non-disclosure of information he
could have used to impeach Woods and the elements of a
Brady violation are not met.
Gravley cannot meet the elements required for this Court to
find a Brady violation, his request for exculpatory
information, assuming that such ...