United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Charles R. Simpson III, Senior Judge United States District
se Plaintiff, Thomas Thome, filed the instant action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because Plaintiff is
proceeding in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. §
1915, the Court must undertake a preliminary review of the
complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e); McGore
v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997),
overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549
U.S. 199 (2007). For the following reasons, the action will
be dismissed in part and allowed to continue in part.
SUMMARY OF CLAIMS
was a state inmate at the Kentucky State Reformatory (KSR).
He states that he was released on April 29, 2016, from KSR
“upon a serve out of his imposed sentence on
conditional discharge.” He alleges that his
constitutional rights were violated because he was not
released from custody at that time but was instead sent to
Transitions Halfway House in Newport, Kentucky. Plaintiff
names as Defendants Matt Bevin, Governor of Kentucky; unknown
Defendants in the Governor's Office; Rodney Ballard,
Commissioner for the Kentucky Department of Corrections
(KDOC); James Erwin, KDOC Deputy Commissioner; Aaron Smith,
Warden of the Kentucky State Reformatory (KSR); Anna
Valentine, KSR Deputy Warden; Ronyell Shirley, KSR Re-Entry
Program Administrator; Ms. Williams and Hilary Rucker, both
KSR Re-Entry/Records specialists; Kimberly Thompson, KSR Unit
Administrator; Ben Mitchell, KSR Assistant Unit
Administrator; Josephine Jacovino and Robert Bearden, both
KSR case treatment officers; unknown Defendants in the
Department of Probation and Parole; and Cassandra West and
Nicole Wilder, both Probation and Parole Officers. His claims
are brought against Defendants in both their individual and
alleges that his constitutional rights were continuously
violated at the Transitions Halfway House until he was
transferred to another halfway house located in Louisville,
Kentucky. He specifically alleges that he “continually
was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment, mental and
emotional distress and the unnessary and wanton infliction of
pain all in violation of Plaintiff's rights under his
5th, 6th, 8th and
14th Amendments . . . under color of law.”
He alleges that Defendants Shirley and Williams knew or
should have known that he had “served out his sentence
on conditional discharge and was to be released from state
custody without further supervision as the record
reflects” but that they allowed Plaintiff to remain in
state custody for at least 43 days past his serve out. He
also alleges that Defendants Rucker, Thompson, Mitchell,
Jacovino, Bearden, West, and Wilder failed to ensure that he
was released without supervision despite being presented with
documentation to that effect.
relief, Plaintiff asks for damages and injunctive relief in
the form of establishment of a board to oversee all divisions
of agencies involved in the release of prisoners.
Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, this
Court must review the instant action. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d
at 608. Upon review, this Court must dismiss a case at any
time if the Court determines that the action is
“frivolous or malicious, ” fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B). A claim is legally frivolous when it
lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke
v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The Court may,
therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on
an indisputably merit less legal theory or where the factual
contentions are clearly baseless. Id. at 327.
determining whether a plaintiff has stated a claim upon which
relief can be granted, the Court must construe the complaint
in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all of
the factual allegations as true. Prater v. City of
Burnside, Ky., 289 F.3d 417, 424 (6th Cir. 2002). A
complaint, or portion thereof, should be dismissed for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
“only if it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff
can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would
entitle him to relief.” Brown v. Bargery, 207
F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000). While a reviewing court must
liberally construe pro se pleadings, Boag v.
MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam), to
avoid dismissal, a complaint must include “enough facts
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007).
REQUEST FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
only injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks is the
establishment of a board to oversee all divisions of agencies
involved in the release of prisoners. Because Plaintiff is no
longer a prisoner, his request for injunctive relief is moot.
See Kensu v. Haigh, 87 F.3d 172, 175 (6th Cir.
1996). Nor can Plaintiff request this relief on behalf of
current prisoners. Unlicensed laymen, like Plaintiff, cannot
represent anyone other than themselves in court. See
28 U.S.C. § 1654; Eagle Assocs. v. Bank of
Montreal, 926 F.2d 1305, 1308 (2d Cir. 1991). The claim
for injunctive relief will be dismissed.
REQUEST FOR DAMAGES
1983 creates no substantive rights, but merely provides
remedies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere.
Flint ex rel. Flint v. Ky. Dep't of Corr., 270
F.3d 340, 351 (6th Cir. 2001). Two elements are required to
state a claim under § 1983. Gomez v. Toledo,
446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). “A plaintiff must allege the
violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of
the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation
was committed by a person acting under color of state
law.” West v. ...