United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Paducah Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
N. STIVERS, JUDGE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Joshua Daniel Scott, a prisoner incarcerated in the Fulton
County Detention Center (FCDC), filed a pro se
complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (DN 1). The
complaint is before the Court for initial review pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A and McGore v. Wrigglesworth,
114 F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other
grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). For the
reasons that follow, the Court will dismiss the
official-capacity claims and allow the Eighth Amendment
individual-capacity claims to proceed.
SUMMARY OF CLAIMS
identifies the following three Defendants in the complaint:
(1) Tommy Henderson, an employee of the City of Hickman; (2)
Jeff Johnson, Chief Deputy Jailer for the FCDC; and (3)
Carroll Powell, Acting Jailer for the FCDC. Plaintiff
indicates that he is suing Defendants in both their
individual and official capacities. He seeks monetary damages
and “to be seen by medical staff other than the Medical
Dept. at Fulton County Jail.”
to Plaintiff, on or about January 12, 2017, he “was in
a accident which hurt [his] back and wrist real bad.”
Plaintiff states that Defendant Henderson “ran the bus
he was driving off the road.” Plaintiff states that
Defendant Henderson denied Plaintiff “medical treatment
by refusing to call the police instead he calls [Defendant
Johnson] at the jail and [Defendant Johnson] comes to the
accident and picks [Plaintiff] up without contacting police
of the accident.”
to Plaintiff, Defendant Johnson placed Plaintiff “in
his car and instead of taking [Plaintiff] to the hospital he
takes [Plaintiff] back to the jail.” Plaintiff states
that he told Defendant Johnson that he was hurt and needed
medical attention, but Defendant Johnson “ignored
[Plaintiff] and [Plaintiff] was given a urine test and once
[Plaintiff] passed was seen by medical staff at the
jail.” Plaintiff states that Defendant Powell
“was told of the accident and has still refused to have
[Plaintiff] seen by medical staff other than the jails
medical so she has denied me proper medical care.”
asserts that “[t]his whole situation has been covered
up any time a accident happens the police must make a report
of it this never happen because [Defendant Henderson] failed
a drug test and lost his job so he must have been high at the
time of the accident.” According to Plaintiff, his
“civil rights as a inmate have been violated and still
are the medical staff at the jail hasn't x-rayed [his]
back or wrist or anything, its clear a cover up is going on
why would a police report not be made in such a situation . .
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff is a prisoner seeking relief against governmental
entities, officers, and/or employees, this Court must review
the instant action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under §
1915A, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss
the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the court
determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v.
Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d at 608.
is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either
in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 325 (1989). The trial court may, therefore, dismiss a
claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably
meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are
clearly baseless. Id. at 327. In order to survive
dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded
factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G
Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009)
(citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th
Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). “But the district
court need not accept a ‘bare assertion of legal
conclusions.'” Tackett v. M & G Polymers,
USA, LLC, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting Columbia Nat.
Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir.
1995)). The court's duty “does not require [it] to
conjure up unpled allegations, ” McDonald v.
Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979), or to create a
claim for a plaintiff. Clark v. Nat'l
Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir.
1975). To command otherwise would require the Court “to
explore exhaustively all potential claims of a pro
se plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district
court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role
of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most
successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v.
City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
fails to state what constitutional rights he believes have
been violated. The Eighth Amendment requires “prison
officials [to] ensure that inmates receive adequate food,
clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must ‘take
reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the
inmates.'” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 832 (1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S.
517, 526-27 (1984)). Accordingly, the Court construes the
complaint as alleging claims under the Eighth Amendment.