United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville
Charles R. Simpson III, Senior Judge.
matter is before the Court on the motion of Defendants
Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government (“Metro
Government”) and the City of Louisville (“the
City”) (collectively, “Defendants”) for
reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b),
ECF No. 272. Plaintiff Kerry Porter responded, ECF No. 277.
Defendants replied, ECF No. 278. For the reasons set forth
below, the Court will grant Defendants' motion to
reconsider the ruling on their motion for summary judgment.
September 26, 2016, Defendants moved for summary judgment on
all claims against them. Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 232. On May 2,
2017, this Court ruled on Defendants' summary judgment
motion. Order, ECF No. 265. The Court granted Defendants'
motion with the exception of Count VIII, which asserts a
state law claim for negligent supervision. Id. Among
the claims dismissed was Count VI which asserted a
Monell claim against Defendants under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Id.; Mem. Op. 59, 66, ECF No. 264.
granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants on
Porter's Monell claim, the Court determined that
Defendants had presented unchallenged evidence that there was
training on, and a written policy concerning the handling of
exculpatory evidence. Mem. Op. 61-62, 66, ECF No. 264.
negligent supervision claim, Porter alleges that Defendants
“had a duty to properly train and supervise” the
Louisville Police Department officers and to “provide
adequate policies” and “were grossly negligent
and negligent in the training, supervision and discipline of
the . . . officers.” Compl. ¶¶ 125-26, ECF
No. 1. He asserts that better training and supervision and
the enactment of additional and different policies would have
prevented the officers from “fabricating evidence,
fabricating witness statements, and concealing material
impeachment evidence, ” which resulted in Porter
“being deprived of his right to due process, and his
right to be free from false arrest, false imprisonment, and
wrongful conviction.” Id. ¶¶ 125,
denying Defendants' motion on the negligent supervision
claim, the Court held:
The City and Metro Government present to the Court the bare
assertion that “Plaintiff has asserted a state law
claim of negligent supervision against the municipal
defendants . . . Plaintiff has failed to establish that his
rights were violated, therefore, his claim of negligent
supervision fails.” Louisville Defs.' Mem. Supp.
Mot. Summ. J. 52-58, ECF No. 232-1. They offer no other
analysis in support of their motion for summary judgment on
this claim. As discussed above, the evidence indicates that
Porter's rights might have been violated. Because the
City and Metro Government offer nothing else in support of
their motion on the negligent supervision claim against them,
the Court will deny summary judgment to them.
Mem. Op. 67, ECF No. 264. In their motion for
reconsideration, Defendants ask this Court to reconsider the
denial of summary judgment on the negligent supervision
claim, urging that their argument addressing the
Monell claim made earlier in their brief also
supports summary judgment as to the claim alleging negligent
supervision. Mot. Recons. 2, ECF No. 272.
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) reads, in relevant part,
“any order . . . that adjudicates fewer than all the
claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the
parties . . . may be revised at any time before the entry of
a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the
parties' rights and liabilities.” Generally, courts
will find justification for reconsideration when there is
“(1) an intervening change of controlling law; (2) new
evidence available; or (3) a need to correct a clear error or
prevent manifest injustice.” Rodriguez v. Tenn.
Laborers Health & Welfare Fund, 89 F. App'x 949,
959 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Reich v. Hall Holding
Co., 990 F.Supp. 955, 965 (N.D. Ohio 1998)).
Reconsideration motions are disfavored and a motion will be
denied “unless it either calls . . . attention to an
argument or controlling authority that was overlooked or
disregarded in the original ruling, presents evidence or
argument that could not previously have been submitted, or
successfully points out a manifest error of fact or
law.” Davie v. Mitchell, 291 F.Supp.2d 573,
634 (N.D. Ohio 2003).
that we must reconsider our denial of summary judgment on
Count VIII, the standard for summary judgment also applies
granting a motion for summary judgment, the Court must find
that “there is no genuine issue of material fact such
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “[W]here the moving
party has the burden-the plaintiff on a claim for relief or
defendant on an affirmative defense-his showing must be
sufficient for the court to hold that no reasonable trier of
fact could find other than for the ...