United States District Court, E.D. Kentucky, Southern Division, Pikeville
OPINION AND ORDER
K. CALDWELL, CHIEF JUDGE
Darryl Williams filed a motion asking this Court to
reconsider, DE 116, the Court's Opinion and Order of May
3, 2017, DE 91, which denied Williams' motion to
suppress. On Tuesday, June 6, 2017, the Court held a pretrial
conference and considered Williams' motion to reconsider.
The Court, out of an abundance of caution, indicated it would
consider additional testimony from Pike County Jailer Freddie
Lewis before rendering a decision. Id. That
rehearing was scheduled for June 19, 2017, in Pikeville, but
was subsequently cancelled, DE 129, after Williams determined
that Lewis “would be unable to provide any new and
material evidence to the Court.” DE 127, at 1.
Accordingly, having dispensed with the need for additional
evidence and argument, this matter is now ripe for review.
For the following reasons, the Court will deny Williams'
facts in this case have been told before. DE 91, at 2-7;
United States v. Williams, No 7:16-15-KKC-EBA-1,
2017 WL 1731702, at *1-*4 (E.D. Ky. May 3, 2017). The Court
will only hit the highlights pertinent to the motion for
reconsideration here. Kentucky State Police Trooper Zach
Bryson received complaints from the community that Williams
was selling prescription medications. Keen on investigating
the matter, Trooper Bryson discussed what he knew with
Williams' good friend, Pike County Jailer Freddie Lewis.
Lewis talked with Williams' brother, Mike, and told him
about Trooper Bryson's investigation. Mike told Williams
about his conversation with Lewis, and, after some
reluctance, Williams agreed to meet with Trooper Bryson. That
same day, Lewis drove Williams to the Kentucky State Police
Post #9 in his 2015 Chevy Tahoe, the same vehicle Lewis used
to transport prisoners for the jail. Williams sat in the
front seat. On the way to the KSP Post, the two talked about
Trooper Bryson's investigation. For Lewis, “the
whole point and reason of the [first] meeting at Post 9 was
to try to  go and try to cooperate because [Williams knew]
what was coming.” DE 107, p. 63, ¶¶ 5-8.
and Lewis walked into the KSP Post together around 2:00 p.m.
Trooper Bryson's office was located in a small room
inside a cinderblock building that sat behind the main KSP
Post. The room was no larger than thirty square feet. The
summer-time heat warmed the room, but the office had a window
air-conditioning unit, and the door to the outside was open
for the duration of the time Williams and Lewis met with
Bryson did not place Williams under arrest and did not
prevent him from leaving the meeting. At no point did Trooper
Bryson read Williams Miranda warnings. Williams
testified that Trooper Bryson “chewed him out”
about the alleged criminal activity. Trooper Bryson denies
anything of the sort. No matter, the meeting proceeded
informally. Williams was unrestrained and took several smoke
breaks during the meeting.
spoke at length with Trooper Bryson and provided information
related to a drug conspiracy. Williams also bragged about his
previous experience as a confidential informant and even
showed Trooper Bryson a video on his phone of him making
controlled purchases. Williams made it clear to Trooper
Bryson that he wanted to do the same in whatever current
investigation the trooper was conducting. Lewis was present
during the meeting, but did not question Williams or
otherwise participate. Lewis recalled “sitting there
thinking to [himself] that [Williams was] doing the right
thing . . . He [was] actually telling the truth, and he
[came] out trying to get ahead of this.” DE 107, p. 62,
meeting ended around 5:00 p.m. Williams provided Trooper
Bryson with a good amount of information, so much so that
Trooper Bryson reached out to DEA Special Agent Gregory Bunch
for help, relaying to the federal officer what he had learned
from Williams at the meeting. DE 107, at 13 (“I told
Special Agent Bunch that basically, you know, I had a guy
coming in to post who confessed to selling pills, to
sponsoring people to go to a doctor, paying their visits, and
for medication to be filled.”). Williams was not
arrested. Instead, Williams and Lewis went to the local Long
John Silvers for a meal.
motion for reconsideration does not dispute any of the legal
analysis in this Court's previous opinion. He does not
dispute the Court's finding that he was not “in
custody” for the purposes of Miranda with
regard to the June 17 meeting between Williams, Trooper
Bryson, and two other officers, DEA Special Agent Dalrymple
and DEA Task Force Officer Brian Metzger. DE 91, at 9-13. Nor
does Williams dispute the Court's finding that he was not
“in custody” for the purposes of Miranda
with regard to the June 24 meeting between Williams and DEA
Special Agent Dalrymple at the London, Kentucky DEA office.
DE 91, at 14-16. Instead, Williams' motion to reconsider
zeroes in on the initial meeting among him, Trooper Bryson,
asserts that the “Court fail[ed] to recognize the fact
that there were two law enforcement officers involved”
when Lewis first drove Williams to meet with Trooper Bryson.
R. 116 at 1-2. Williams argues, because Lewis drove him to
the initial meeting with Trooper Bryson, that meeting became
inherently coercive because Lewis had the ability to arrest
Williams. DE 116, at 2 (“Indeed, Jailer Lewis was and
is a peace officer with full powers of arrest.”). In
essence, Williams now argues that Lewis and Trooper Bryson
“colluded” to get information out of Williams.
This “collusion, ” as the Court understands the
argument, transforms the initial meeting into a custodial
interrogation requiring the suppression of all statements
made to Trooper Bryson because they were made without
Williams having been read any Miranda rights. Such a
theory is unsupported by the facts and finds no refuge in the
law. Williams' motion for reconsideration, DE 116,
therefore must be denied.
initial matter, this argument is not properly before the
Court. Williams did not raise the prospect of a
constitutional violation during the initial meeting among
himself, Lewis, and Trooper Bryson in his original motion to
suppress. Nowhere in his filings did Williams argue that the
first meeting violated his constitutional rights. Instead,
the original motion (and as a result, the Court's
original opinion) focused solely on the June 17 and June 24
adjudicating [motions to reconsider] in criminal cases
typically evaluate such motions under the same standards
applicable to a civil motion to alter or amend judgment
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e).” United States v.
Rowe, No. 5:19-19-KSF, 2013 WL 3213079, at *2 (E.D. Ky.
June 24, 2013) (citing United States v. Canal Bridge Co.,
Inc., No. 4:07-CR-12-JHM, at * 1 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 4, 2009)
(collecting cases)). A motion pursuant to Rule 59(e) may be
granted if there is: “(1) a clear error of law; (2)
newly discovered evidence; (3) an intervening change in
controlling law; or (4) a need to prevent manifest
injustice.” Intera Corp. v. Henderson, 428
F.3d 605, 620 (6th Cir.2005). Rule 59(e), however, ...