United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
J. Hale, United States District Judge.
se Plaintiff Mauricio Martinez, a pretrial detainee at
Louisville Metro Department of Corrections (LMDC), initiated
this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action by filing a complaint (DN
1). Upon review, the Court directed Plaintiff to file a more
specific and detailed amended complaint (DN 6), which
Plaintiff has now filed (DN 7). The complaint and amended
complaint are now before the Court for screening pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A and McGore v. Wrigglesworth,
114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds
by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). For the reasons
set forth below, the action will be dismissed in part, but
Plaintiff will be allowed to amend his complaint.
SUMMARY OF COMPLAINTS
upon a combined reading of Plaintiff's complaint and
amended complaint, it appears that Plaintiff is suing Mark
Bolton, in both his individual and official
capacities;“LMDC Security;” and fellow
inmate Nicholas Espinoza.
amended complaint, Plaintiff writes as follows in the section
titled Statement of Claim(s):
I am in protective custody on H6-S1-#12 this morning 1-20-17.
I was asleep in my bed and was attacked by another inmate
outside of P.C. fro East walk from admis. Seg. 2 Separate
Gates were left unlocked to allow me to be assaulted.
Nicholas Espinoza came through both gates and into my cell
and attacked me, punching me multiple times on my mouth and
eye. I have a loose tooth and a blur eye. I am suppose to be
protected while in P.C. but I was assaulted while asleep by
someone outside of P.C. because of a lack of proper
protection from LMDC personnel. I feel my life is in jeopardy
while here in LMDC I'm still having dreams of being
attack by inmates that is housed around me. All this whole
incident was on DVR. Around the whole South 1 of H6 every
minute was recorded on that date which was ones again 1-20-17
time was 7:45/9:45 between that time. I feel for my life and
safety in the LMDC jail. I been tryin get the names of the
C.O.'s who was working that day they tell me they
(emphasis added). In his complaint, Plaintiff also writes:
“This was a set up on behalf of LMDC which is ran by
Mark Bolton.” (emphasis added).
relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages.
Plaintiff is a prisoner seeking relief against governmental
entities, officers, and/or employees, this Court must review
the instant action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under §
1915A, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss
the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the court
determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v.
Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d at 604. In order to survive
dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded
factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G
Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009)
(citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th
Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). “[A] pro se
complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89
(2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106
(1976)). However, while liberal, this standard of review does
require more than the bare assertion of legal conclusions.
See Columbia Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum,
58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995). The court's duty
“does not require [it] to conjure up unpled
allegations, ” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16,
19 (1st Cir. 1979), or to create a claim for a plaintiff.
Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life Ins. Co.,
518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975). To command otherwise
would require the court “to explore exhaustively all
potential claims of a pro se plaintiff, [and] would
also transform the district court from its legitimate
advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out
the strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a
party.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d
1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
1983 creates no substantive rights but merely provides
remedies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere.
Flint ex rel. Flint v. Ky. Dep't of Corr., 270
F.3d 340, 351 (6th Cir. 2001). Two elements are required to
state a claim under § 1983. Gomez v. Toledo,
446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). “A plaintiff must allege the
violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of
the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation
was committed by a person acting under color of state
law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
“Absent either element, a § 1983 claim will not
lie.” Christy v. Randlett, 932 F.2d 502, 504
(6th Cir. 1991).