United States District Court, E.D. Kentucky, Southern Division, London
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Gregory F. Van Tatenhove United States District Judge
Andrew Arroyo, Jr., is an inmate at the United States
Penitentiary - McCreary in Pine Knot, Kentucky. Proceeding
without an attorney, Arroyo filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. [R. 1, 7.]
For the reasons set forth below, the Court will deny
2006, Arroyo pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with the
intent to distribute a controlled substance in violation of
21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846. See United States v.
Arroyo, No. 3:06-cr-479-PRM (W.D. Tex. 2006). The United
States District Court for the Western District of Texas
determined that Arroyo was a career offender pursuant to
section 4B1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines
because he had at least two prior felony convictions for
either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.
Ultimately, the trial court sentenced Arroyo to 210 months in
prison. [See Id. at R. 73.]
Arroyo did not file a direct appeal, he did move to vacate,
set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255. [See Id. at R. 74.] However, the
district court denied that motion, [see Id. at R.
95], as well as other motions Arroyo filed seeking a
reduction in his sentence. [See Id. at R. 100, 131.]
has now filed a § 2241 petition with this Court. Arroyo
appears to be arguing that, in light of the Supreme
Court's decision in Mathis v. United States, 136
S.Ct. 2243 (2016), his prior felony convictions are no longer
valid predicate offenses to subject him to the
career-offender enhancement under the sentencing guidelines.
Indeed, Arroyo cites Mathis and argues that two of
his “prior offenses are no longer a categorical match
for a ‘crime of violence'” and thus he
“is actually innocent of the career offender
enhancement.” [R. 7 at 2.]
§ 2241 petition, however, is an impermissible collateral
attack on his sentence. That is because while a federal
prisoner may challenge the legality of his sentence in a
§ 2255 motion, he generally may not do so in a §
2241 petition. See United States v. Peterman, 249
F.3d 458, 461 (6th Cir. 2001) (explaining the distinction
between a § 2255 motion and a § 2241 petition).
After all, a § 2241 petition does not function as an
additional or alternative remedy to the one available under
§ 2255. Hernandez v. Lamanna, 16 F. App'x
317, 360 (6th Cir. 2001). Instead, a § 2241 petition is
usually only a vehicle for challenges to actions taken by
prison officials that affect the manner in which the
prisoner's sentence is being carried out, such as
computing sentence credits or determining parole eligibility.
See Terrell v. United States, 564 F.3d 442, 447 (6th
Cir. 2009). Simply put, Arroyo cannot use a § 2241
petition as a way of challenging his sentence.
nevertheless argues that § 2255(e)'s savings clause
permits him to attack his sentence in a § 2241 petition
[R. 1 at 5], and it appears that he is trying to rely on the
Sixth Circuit's decision in Hill v. Masters, 836
F.3d 591 (6th Cir. 2016), to support his position. [R. 7 at
2.] But Arroyo's argument is off base. To be sure, the
Sixth Circuit has said that “the so-called savings
clause of section 2255 provides that if section 2255 is
inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his
detention, . . . then a federal prisoner may also challenge
the validity of his conviction or sentence under §
2241.” Bess v. Walton, 468 F. App'x 588,
589 (6th Cir. 2012) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted). Then, in Hill v. Masters, 836 F.3d 591
(6th Cir. 2016), the Sixth Circuit explained the
circumstances under which a prisoner may challenge a sentence
enhancement in a § 2241 petition. However, in doing so,
the Sixth Circuit expressly limited those circumstances to
a narrow subset of § 2241 petitions: (1) prisoners who
were sentenced under the mandatory guidelines regime
pre-United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 . . .
(2005), (2) who were foreclosed from filing a successive
petition under § 2255, and (3) when a subsequent,
retroactive change in statutory interpretation by the Supreme
Court reveals that a previous conviction is not a predicate
offense for a career-offender enhancement.
Hill, 836 F.3d at 599-600.
circumstances do not apply in this case. After all, the trial
court sentenced Arroyo in October 2006, well after the
Supreme Court decided Booker and held that the
sentencing guidelines were advisory. Therefore, Arroyo's
argument regarding § 2255(e)'s savings clause and
his reliance on Hill are simply unavailing.
IT IS ORDERED that:
Arroyo's petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2241 [R. 1, 7] is DENIED.
This action is DISMISSED and STRICKEN from the ...