United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville Division
CHRISTINA FARLOUGH, as Administrator of the Estate of Randall Sharp, Plaintiff,
AVDIJA HUSKIC, et al., Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
J. HALE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Sharp died in a tractor-trailer accident involving Defendant
Avdija Huskic, an employee of Defendant FE Express, LLC.
Plaintiff Christina Farlough, as administrator of Sharp's
estate, alleges that Huskic negligently caused Sharp's
death. (Docket No. 1-4, PageID # 25) The matter is set for
trial on July 31, 2017. (D.N. 45) Huskic and FE Express have
filed motions in limine seeking to exclude certain evidence
that may be offered by Farlough. (D.N. 50) For the reasons
explained below, the motions will be granted in part and
denied in part.
Motion to Exclude Earnings Documentation
defendants first move to exclude documents identified by
Farlough as evidence of Sharp's earnings: a Social
Security earnings report and 1099s, a spreadsheet, and an
employment contract from Sharp's employer, MB Global
Logistics, Inc. (D.N. 50, PageID # 161-70) With respect to
the MB Global documents, the defendants' motion is
premised on the assumption that no corporate representative
will be present at trial to authenticate and introduce them.
(Id., PageID # 165) Farlough concedes that without
authentication by an MB Global representative, the documents
are inadmissible, but she notes that the necessary
“foundation may yet be laid at trial.” (D.N. 51,
PageID # 349) The Court will therefore defer ruling as to the
MB Global documents.
respect to the Social Security earnings report, Farlough
maintains that no witness is necessary. (Id., PageID
# 347-78) Pointing to the defendants' acknowledgment that
the report “is authenticated as a public record under
FRE 901(7), ” Farlough argues that the document is
admissible under the public-records exception to the hearsay
rule. (D.N. 50, PageID # 163; see D.N. 51, PageID #
348) Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8), “[a]
record or statement of a public office” is not excluded
by the rule against hearsay if
(A) it sets out:
(i) the office[']s activities;
(ii) a matter observed while under a legal duty to report . .
(iii) in a civil case . . ., factual findings from a legally
authorized investigation; and
(B) the opponent does not show that the source of information
or other circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness.
Fed. R. Evid. 803(8). Farlough asserts that the Social
Security document at issue here is admissible under Rule
803(8)(A)(i) because “recording the reported earnings
of an individual, such as Mr. Sharp, is part of the duties of
the [Social Security Administration].” (D.N. 51, Page
ID # 347) But the document does not “set out . . .
the [SSA's] activities”; rather, as the defendants
observe, it is merely “a summary of information
reported by employers.” (D.N. 50, PageID # 163) In other
words, “the information [contained in the report] was
not generated by the SSA” (id.) and does not
reflect actions taken by the SSA. The report will therefore
be excluded pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 802.
Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony
agrees that the defendants' motion to exclude expert
testimony may be granted with respect to all but one of her
disclosed experts: Avdija Huskic. (D.N. 51, PageID # 349-50)
Farlough maintains that she “is entitled to qualify Mr.
Huskic as an expert” notwithstanding his status as an
adverse party. (Id.) She cites no authority in
support of this contention, and the Court is aware of none.
expert disclosures, Farlough simply stated that Huskic
“is expected to testify concerning the underlying
collision and his observations, his actions immediately prior
to, during, and after the accident, and to testify regarding
his specialized knowledge obtained through his experience as
a truck driver, including standards of safe trucking.”
(D.N. 35, PageID # 125) This brief, nonspecific description
does not satisfy Rule 26's requirement of “a
summary of the facts and opinions to which the witness is
expected to testify.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(2)(C)(ii).
Thus, as an initial matter, ...