United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Paducah Division
B. RUSSELL, SENIOR JUDGE.
pro se, Amos Lamb filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983
action against Deputy Sheriff David Bailey and the Calloway
County Sheriff's Department. Lamb alleges that, contrary
to his Fourth (and Fourteenth) Amendment rights, Deputy
Bailey stopped his vehicle and arrested him without cause.
With discovery closed, each side moves for summary judgment.
For the following reasons, Lamb's Motion for Summary
Judgment, [R. 25], is DENIED, and Deputy Bailey and the
Department's Motion for Summary Judgment, [R. 35], is
August 15, 2015, Deputy Sheriff David Bailey of the Calloway
County Sheriff's Department saw a white Chevrolet van
travelling southbound on Highway 121 in New Concord,
Kentucky. [R. 34-1 at 1, ¶¶ 1-3 (Bailey's
Affidavit).] He pulled behind the van and attempted to run
its license plate, but a trailer hitch (or a makeshift
bumper) obstructed his view. [Id., ¶ 4.] Unable
to make out the vehicle's license plate, he initiated a
traffic stop. [Id.]
Bailey approached the driver, whom he later identified as
Amos Lamb, and asked for his license and registration.
[Id., ¶ 5.] Lamb was unable to produce a valid
driver's license, and so Deputy Bailey returned to his
vehicle and called dispatch to run the van's tags.
[Id.] When dispatch advised that the plate was
registered to a different vehicle, Deputy Bailey arrested
Lamb. [Id., ¶¶ 5-7.] He charged Lamb with,
inter alia, failure of a non-owner operator to
maintain required insurance, to produce an insurance card, to
produce an operator's license, to maintain valid
registration, and to display valid registration plates. [R.
34-2 at 1-2 (Uniform Citation No. CA14763).]
appeared before Calloway County District Court Judge Randall
Hutchens on August 16, 2015. [R. 35-10 at 1 (Conditions of
Release and Judicial Decision).] Originally, his bond was set
at $2, 500 cash. [Id.] The following day, Lamb was
arraigned and his bond was amended to $2, 500 cash or surety.
[R. 35-11 at 1 (Order of Arraignment).] Lamb's sister
posted bond that morning. [R. 35-12 at 1 (Acknowledgement of
Scheduled Court Appearance).] A preliminary hearing was
scheduled for September 30. [R. 35-13 at 1 (Order from
to the preliminary hearing, Lamb filed a motion to suppress
all evidence gathered as result of the traffic stop. [R. 35-4
at 1-2 (Motion to Suppress).] Perhaps more importantly, he
produced a valid driver's license and proof of
registration to the Calloway County Attorney before the
preliminary hearing too. [R. 31 (DVD of Preliminary
Hearing).] In light of that development, the County Attorney
moved to dismiss the charges against Lamb without prejudice.
[Id.] Judge Hutchens granted that request without
passing on Lamb's motion to suppress. [R. 35-17 at 1
(Order of September 30, 2015).]
one year later, Lamb sued Deputy Bailey and the Calloway
County Sheriff's Department under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging that Deputy Bailey's “unlawful stop”
and “false arrest” violated his Sixth, Eighth,
and Fourteenth Amendment rights. [R. 1 at 1-2 (Complaint).]
Shortly after, he sought leave to amend his complaint to add
a Fourth Amendment claim too. [R. 11 at 1 (Motion for
Leave).] The Court granted that request, but Lamb failed to
file an amended complaint. [R. 12 (Order of December 28,
2016).] Nonetheless, Lamb's subsequent filings evince an
intent to replace the Sixth and Eighth Amendment claims in
the original complaint with a Fourth Amendment claim instead.
[See R. 33 at 123 (Lamb's Deposition); R. 35-3
at 16, ¶¶ 13-14 (Responses to Interrogatories).]
Therefore, in the interest of justice, the Court will
construe Lamb's complaint as alleging wrongful-stop and
wrongful-arrest claims rooted in the Fourth Amendment.
See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). With
discovery now closed, both parties move for summary
judgment. [R. 25 (Lamb's Motion for Summary
Judgment); R. 35 (Defendants' Motion for Summary
judgment is appropriate when the record, viewed in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party, reveals “that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of material fact exists
where “there is sufficient evidence favoring the
nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that
party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 249 (1986). The Court “may not make
credibility determinations nor weigh the evidence when
determining whether an issue of fact remains for
trial.” Laster v. City of Kalamazoo, 746 F.3d
714, 726 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Logan v. Denny's,
Inc., 259 F.3d 558, 566 (6th Cir. 2001); Ahlers v.
Schebil, 188 F.3d 365, 369 (6th Cir. 1999)). “The
ultimate question is ‘whether the evidence presents a
sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or
whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a
matter of law.'” Back v. Nestlé USA,
Inc., 694 F.3d 571, 575 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52).
parties ask for summary judgment on competing grounds. On the
one hand, Lamb argues that the decision to dismiss the
charges against him without prejudice conclusive establishes
the absence of probable cause for his arrest. [R. 25 at 2; R.
38 at 1 (Reply in Support of Lamb's Motion for Summary
Judgment).] Deputy Bailey and the Department stress, on the
other hand, that probable cause supported the traffic stop
and arrest, and so Lamb's claim must fail as a matter of
law. [R. 35-1 at 12-15 (Memorandum in Support of