United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Paducah
B. Russell, Senior Judge.
Kacy Lee Sigrist, a prisoner incarcerated in the McCracken
County Jail, filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (DN 1). This matter is before the Court on
initial screening of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A. For the reasons that follow, the Court will
dismiss the instant action.
brings suit against the following Defendants: the McCracken
Co. Sheriff's Dept. (MCSD); Jesse Riddell in the
narcotics unit of MCSD; and Ryan Norman in the K-9 narcotics
unit of MCSD.
complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on August 21, 2013, he and
a woman named Victoria were pulled over by Defendant Riddell
and other officers, who searched and arrested Victoria and
released Plaintiff. He states that his mother and her fiance
gave him a ride to Victoria's apartment, where
“Officer Riddell was already present, he had a search
conducted on my mother and her fiance as well as myself upon
arrival in the driveway of her residence.” Plaintiff
continues, “Officer Riddell called me to the side and
asked me why I was there. I told him to get my house keys to
my mothers residence as well as my eye glasses. Officer
Riddell looked at Ryan Norman and said to him 10-15 and I was
handcuffed and brought to the Paducah jail.” He reports
that he was “charged and given a bond of $1, 500 wich
my mother had posted.” He claims, “My freedom was
taken for alleged possesion of Meth and paraphernalia that I
never possessed. I feel that my right to freedom was violated
and I was unlawfuly charged and imprisoned.” Plaintiff
reports that his defense counsel helped prove his innocence
in the McCracken Circuit Court and that his case was
dismissed on March 11, 2014. He states that he spent
approximately 54 days in jail as a result of this incident.
relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages.
Plaintiff is a prisoner seeking relief against governmental
entities, officers, and/or employees, this Court must review
the instant action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under §
1915A, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss
the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the court
determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v.
Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997),
overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549
U.S. 199 (2007).
is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either
in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 325 (1989). The trial court may, therefore, dismiss a
claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably
meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are
clearly baseless. Id. at 327. In order to survive
dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded
factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G
Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009)
(citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th
Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). “A pleading that
offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.' Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders
‘naked assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further
factual enhancement.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
1983 does not contain its own statute of limitations period,
but it is well settled that constitutional claims asserted
under § 1983 are governed by the state personal injury
statute of limitations. Fox v. DeSoto, 489 F.3d 227,
233 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471
U.S. 261, 280 (1985)). Personal injury actions in Kentucky
“shall be commenced within one (1) year after the cause
of action accrued.” Ky. Rev. Stat. § 413.140(1);
Collard v. Ky. Bd. of Nursing, 896 F.2d 179, 182
(6th Cir. 1990).
the applicable statute of limitations is determined by state
law, the “date on which the statute of limitations
begins to run in a § 1983 action is a question of
federal law.” Eidson v. State of Tenn. Dep't of
Children's Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 635 (2007) (citing
Kuhnle Bros., Inc. v. Cty. of Geauga, 103 F.3d 516,
519 (6th Cir.1997)). “[I]t is the standard rule that
accrual occurs when the plaintiff has a complete and present
cause of action . . . that is, when the plaintiff can file
suit and obtain relief.” Wallace v. Kato, 549
U.S. 384, 388 (2007) (citing Bay Area Laundry
& Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of
Cal, 522 U.S. 192, 201 (1997) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted)). “[A] claim for wrongful arrest
under § 1983 accrues at the time of the arrest or, at
the latest, when detention without legal process ends.”
Fox v. DeSoto, 489 F.3d at 233 (citing Wallace
v. Kato, 549 U.S. at 397).
the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, a court
may raise the issue sua sponte if the defense is
obvious from the face of the complaint. Fields v.
Campbell, 39 F. App'x 221, 223 (6th Cir. 2002)