United States District Court, E.D. Kentucky, Central Division, Lexington
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
DANNY
C. REEVES UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Curtis
Parks stands accused of a single count of harboring or
concealing a fugitive in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1071.
[Record No. 7] Parks acted as a driver for Samuel Girod, a
member of the Amish community in Bath County, Kentucky, and
is alleged to have done so while Girod was subject to an
arrest warrant issued by this Court. [Record No. 1-1;
see Lexington Criminal Action No. 5: 15-87-DCR]
Despite knowledge of the warrant, Parks is accused of taking
certain actions to help Girod evade capture.
I.
Defendant’s Argument
Parks
has moved in limine to exclude from trial any
evidence identifying the underlying charges faced by Girod.
[Record No. 33] Parks argues that, while he was aware that
Girod had an outstanding warrant, “his knowledge was
that the offense related to ‘chic weed.’”
[Id. at 2] Further, because “[t]here is no
requirement that the defendant know the reason for the
warrant or the charges to which the warrant relates,”
Parks wishes to exclude that information. [Id.]
Parks believes that mention of Girod’s charges of
“‘obstruction’ and/or
‘intimidation’” could be prejudicial
“to a great degree” to the jury’s
perception of whether he assisted Girod with the intent of
helping him avoid his arrest. [Id. at 3]
Accordingly, Parks seeks a limiting instruction that evidence
of Girod’s outstanding warrant be limited to the fact
of the warrant, with any mention of the underlying charges
barred.
The defendant also seeks to exclude any mention of the fact
that he was carrying a concealed weapon at the time of his
apprehension. [Record No. 33 at 3] Parks argues that he is a
responsible gun owner, trained and educated in proper gun
care, ownership and handling, and that he was properly
licensed to carry and conceal the firearm.[*]
[Id.] Parks contends “there was certainly no
criminal intent behind his ownership and concealing of the
gun,” and “[t]here is no evidence the gun was
ever brandished, used to threaten[,] or has any relation
whatsoever to the offense[,] other than it was on the
Defendant’s person at the time of arrest.”
[Id. at 3-4]
II.
Government’s Response
The
United States opposes Parks’s motion. [Record No. 34]
Regarding the underlying charges faced by Girod, it argues
that explaining the nature of those charges “is plainly
relevant to the case.” [Id. at 1]
Specifically, Girod’s charges are relevant and properly
admissible as background evidence-“the general nature
of the charges that prompted Mr. Girod to flee is a natural
part of the story.” [Id. at 2] Further, the
government believes that Girod’s twelve-count
indictment, including three obstruction of justice charges,
is relevant to the defendant’s “intent and motive
in providing assistance to Mr. Girod.” [Id. at
2] And because the conduct at issue relates to a third party,
rather than the defendant himself, the government believes
that concern of unfair prejudice under Rule 403 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence is minimal.
With
respect to Parks’s firearm possession, the United
States argues that an individual’s “[decision] to
carry a weapon-even if legally permitted to do so-while
transporting a known federal fugitive, is potentially
relevant to a charge under 18 U.S.C. § 1071[.]”
[Id. at 3] Particularly, the defendant’s
carrying of a firearm may be relevant to his intent.
[Id.] Nonetheless, the United States does not plan
to introduce evidence of the firearm in the defendant’s
possession unless Parks testifies, in which case it may
cross-examine him regarding his habits of carrying the
firearm. [Id.] The government believes that any
unfair prejudice will be minimal because the firearm was
lawfully possessed. [Id.] The United States has the
better arguments under the facts presented. Therefore, the
defendant’s motion will be denied.
III.
Discussion
a.
Underlying Charges
Under
Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, evidence is
relevant if “it has any tendency to make a fact more or
less probable than it would be without the evidence”
and “the fact is of consequence in determining the
action.” Under the rule, the underlying charges faced
by Girod are relevant. Specifically, a conviction under 18
U.S.C. §1071 requires proof of a defendant’s
intent. The fugitive’s underlying charges are relevant
to establish Parks’s intent and motive. See United
States v. Robinson, 908 F. Supp. 2d 753');">908 F. Supp. 2d 753, 759 (W.D. Va.
2012) (“The nature and severity of the underlying
charges is probative of their intent and motive in their
behavior towards [the fugitive].”). Parks’s
willingness to stipulate to the existence of a warrant does
not mitigate that relevance. See Id. (“[T]he
nature of the warrant in the present case has probative value
beyond the mere fact of the warrant’s
existence.”). In short, Girod’s charges
“complete[] the story of the charged offense.”
United States v. Hardy, 228 F.3d 745, 748 (6th Cir.
2000) (discussing admissibility of relevant background
information); see also United States v. Marrero, 651
F.3d 453, 471 (6th Cir. 2011) (applying Hardy). This
is especially true, as the United States points out, because
evidence at trial is expected to show that Parks made
comments to law enforcement officers about the merits of the
underlying case against Girod. [Record No. 34 at 2]
Notwithstanding
the relevance of this evidence, it may still be excluded.
Rule 403 provides that the Court “may exclude relevant
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue
delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative
evidence.” Parks believes that the mention of
Girod’s “‘obstruction’ and/or
‘intimidation’” charges could be
prejudicial “to a great degree” and, therefore,
should be excluded. [Record No. 33 at 3] The Court disagrees.
The
underlying conduct of a third party does typically raise a
heightened concern under Rule 403. See Robinson, 908
F. Supp. 2d at 759 (“The criminal conduct at issue in
the present case is that of a third party and therefore does
not raise the same concerns about the introduction of
improper and unfair character evidence against these
defendants.”). Moreover, as the United States argues,
misbranding and obstruction of justice do not carry the same
concerns of unfair prejudice as, for example, narcotics
offenses or crimes of violence. All things considered, any
possible prejudice does not substantially outweigh the
evidence’s probative value.
b.
...