United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
N. Stivers, Judge United States District Court
matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment (DN 22). For the reasons outlined below, the
motion is GRANTED.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND CLAIMS
September 23, 2013, Plaintiff Christy Dickerson Ford
(“Ford”) was injured in an automobile collision
when her car was struck by an oncoming vehicle. (Notice
Removal Ex., DN 1-2 [hereinafter Compl.]). At the time of the
accident, Ford had an insurance policy in effect issued by
Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
(“State Farm”). (Compl. ¶ 8; Defs.' Mem.
Supp. Mot. Dismiss Ex. A, DN 22-2). That coverage included
no-fault or personal-injury protection (“PIP”)
benefits in the amount of $10, 000, and underinsured
motorists (“UIM”) coverage in the amount of $25,
000. (Defs.' Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss Ex. A, at 2).
November 20, 2013, Ford's counsel wrote State Farm and
directed State Farm to pay any remaining PIP benefits
directly to her and her counsel. (Defs.' Mem. Supp. Mot.
Dismiss Ex. E, DN 22-6). On November 25, 2013, State Farm
sent a letter to Ford's counsel notifying him that
Ford's PIP benefits had been exhausted. (Defs.' Mem.
Supp. Mot. Dismiss Ex. F, DN 22-7).
February 15, 2016, Ford filed suit in Bullitt Circuit Court
against Defendants Farm asserting claims of breach of
contract relating to her policy's UIM benefits, and bad
faith under common law and the Kentucky Unfair Claims
Settlement Practices Act (“UCSPA”), KRS
304.12-230. (Compl. ¶¶ 7-24). Defendants
subsequently removed the case to this Court. (Notice Removal,
DN 1). While Ford was originally represented by counsel, her
attorney withdrew during the pendency of Defendants'
summary judgment motion. (Order, DN 25). Ford filed a pro
se response. (Pl.'s Resp. Defs.' Mot. Summ. J.,
Court has subject-matter jurisdiction of this matter based
upon diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §
STANDARD OF REVIEW
ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must
determine whether there is any genuine issue of material fact
that would preclude entry of judgment for the moving party as
a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The
moving party bears the initial burden of stating the basis
for the motion and identifying evidence in the record that
demonstrates an absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986). If the moving party satisfies its burden, the
non-moving party must then produce specific evidence proving
the existence of a genuine issue of fact for trial. See
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48
the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party, the non-moving party must do more
than merely show the existence of some “metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586
(1986) (citation omitted). Rather, the non-moving party must
present specific facts proving that a genuine factual issue
exists by “citing to particular parts of the materials
in the record” or by “showing that the materials
cited do not establish the absence . . . of a genuine
dispute.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). “The mere
existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the
[non-moving party's] position will be insufficient; there
must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for
the [non-moving party].” Anderson , 477 U.S.
Farm moves for summary judgment on two bases: (i) that
Ford's UIM claim is barred by the insurance policy's
contractual limitations period; and (ii) that her UCSPA claim
must fail because her underlying breach of contract claim is
time-barred. (Defs.' Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 4-9, DN
22-1). Each basis will be addressed separately.