United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Bowling Green Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
N. Stivers, Judge.
matter comes before the Court on Objection of Defendant
Charles Henry Ickes (“Ickes”) (DN 270) to the
Magistrate Judge's Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Recommendation (DN 269). For the following reasons,
Magistrate Judge Report and Recommendation is
ADOPTED and Defendant's Objection is
Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation
(“R&R”) sets forth in detail the relevant
facts of this matter, which the Court incorporates herein
without a recitation. (R. & R. 2-3, DN 269).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
United States v. Curtis, 237 F.3d 598 (6th Cir.
2001), the Sixth Circuit articulated the proper standard of
review for objections to a ruling or recommendation by a
Magistrate Judge, stating:
[Section] 636(b) creates two different standards of review
for district courts when a magistrate court's finding is
challenged in district court. A district court shall apply a
“clearly erroneous or contrary to law” standard
of review for the “nondispositive” preliminary
measures of § 636(b)(1)(A). Conversely,
“dispositive motions” excepted from §
636(b)(1)(A), such as motions for summary judgment or for
the suppression of evidence, are governed by the de
Id. at 603 (emphasis added) (internal citation
omitted) (citation omitted).
Magistrate Judge recommended denial of Ickes' Motion to
Suppress (DN 261). (R. & R. 7). Ickes objects to the
Magistrate Judge's R&R and suggests that the
Magistrate Judge ignored his argument that the exception to
the warrant requirement for probationers did not apply to him
because he was already in custody during the time of the
search. (Def.'s Obj. to R. & R. 3, DN 270
[hereinafter Def.'s Obj.]).
Objection to the R&R is presented to the Court by way of
a literal “copy and paste” of the argument
section from the Motion to Suppress. (Def.'s Obj. 3-5;
Def.'s Mot. Suppress 4-5, DN 261). An objection that
merely incorporates portions of a defendant's prior
motion is insufficient to meet the “specific written
objection[s] to the proposed findings and
recommendations” as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2).
Edwards v. Niagara Credit Sols., Inc., 586 F.Supp.2d
1346, 1348 (N.D.Ga. 2008), aff'd on other
grounds, 584 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2)).
See also Manigaulte v. C.W. Post of Long Island
Univ., 659 F.Supp.2d 367, 372 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)
(“[W]hen a party makes only conclusory or general
objections, or simply reiterates his original arguments, the
Court reviews the Report and Recommendation only for clear
error.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation
omitted)). Moreover, a reexamination of the exact same
argument that was presented to the magistrate judge without
specific objections “wastes judicial resources rather
than saving them, and runs contrary to the purpose of the
Magistrates Act.” Howard v. Sec'y of Health
& Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991).
Considering that Ickes' argument was already raised to
the Magistrate Judge, the Court should review his Objection
only for clear error.
even if the Court was to conduct a de novo review,
Ickes' Objection does not change the outcome. Ickes is a
probationer in the state of California and his conditions of
probation includes the following provision:
Defendant shall submit to search and seizure of his/her
person, place of residence or area under his/her control, or
vehicle, by any probation officer or peace officer, during
the day or night, with or without her/her consent, with or
without a search warrant, and without regard to probable
(Pl.'s Resp. Def.'s Mot. Suppress Ex. A, at 5, DN
263-1). The Magistrate Judge correctly explained, and Ickes
concedes, that a search warrant is not necessary
“[w]hen an officer has reasonable suspicion that a
probationer subject to a search condition is engaged in
criminal activity . . . .” United States v.
Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121 (2001). Yet, Ickes attempts
to distinguish his case by reiterating his same arguments set
forth in the Motion to Suppress. Ickes argues that the fact
that he was in custody during the search militates against
the government's right to conduct a probation search of
his property. (Def.'s Obj. 3-5). Specifically, Ickes
argues that “two of the primary goals of probation
“recognized in Knights . . . ...