United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Owensboro Division
H. McKINLEY JR. JUDGE
se Plaintiff Glenn Aaron Armstead filed the instant
action. Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma
pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court must
undertake a preliminary review of the complaint. See
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e); McGore v. Wrigglesworth,
114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds
by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). For the following
reasons, the action will be dismissed.
SUMMARY OF CLAIMS
brings this action against the Kentucky Cabinet for Health
and Human Services, D. Brent Irvin at Legal Services, and the
Social Security Administration. He states that the basis for
this Court's jurisdiction is the False Claims Act,
“31 U.S. Code 3729-3733.” The complaint states
that the amount in controversy is “72 months of health
care and $730 benefit involved.” He alleges:
“Cabinet refused settlement outside of court privacy
issue. Did not live in Commonwealth[.] documents -- dates --
case # -- false all documents. Statements from CHFS saying
SSA sent information out. I received it from CHFS. Dates --
my government name [--] all documents false.” The
date back 6 years with my government name and health
information. I lived in Indiana on 90 percent of the dates,
not Kentucky. Information was mailed on form PA-11 from
Cabinet for Health, Cabinet said information came from SSA
but the claim has the truth 6 years of documents dates case #
11534348 CHFS. I have the documents with all dates from 4/10
- 4/16. Documents say approved 72 times. Lived in Indiana on
these dates. My Indiana records show facts.
relief, Plaintiff asks for “tort relief.”
Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, this
Court must review the instant action. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d
at 608. Upon review, this Court must dismiss a case at any
time if the Court determines that the action is
“frivolous or malicious, ” fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B). A claim is legally frivolous when it
lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke
v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The Court may,
therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on
an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual
contentions are clearly baseless. Id. at 327.
determining whether a plaintiff has stated a claim upon which
relief can be granted, the Court must construe the complaint
in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all of
the factual allegations as true. Prater v. City of
Burnside, Ky., 289 F.3d 417, 424 (6th Cir. 2002). A
complaint, or portion thereof, should be dismissed for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
“only if it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff
can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would
entitle him to relief.” Brown v. Bargery, 207
F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000). While a reviewing court must
liberally construe pro se pleadings, Boag v.
MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam), to
avoid dismissal, a complaint must include “enough facts
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007).
False Claims Act (FCA) is found at 31 U.S.C. § 3729,
et seq. It “is an anti-fraud statute that
prohibits the knowing submission of false or fraudulent
claims to the federal government.” United States ex
rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 342 F.3d 634,
640 (6th Cir. 2003). Under the FCA, a private individual,
known as a relator, may bring suit alleging FCA violations on
behalf of the government; such an action is known as a
qui tam action. Id.; United States v.
Health Possibilities, P.S.C., 207 F.3d 335, 342 n.5 (6th
Cir. 2000) (noting that “the United States is the
real-party-in-interest in FCA litigation”).
qui tam actions cannot be brought by a pro
se relator. Because “a qui tam relator .
. . sues on behalf of the government and not himself[, h]e
therefore must comply with the general rule prohibiting
nonlawyers from representing other litigants.”
United States ex rel. Szymczak v. Covenant Healthcare
Sys., Inc., 207 F. App'x 731, 732 (7th Cir. 2006)
(citation omitted); see also Jones v. Jindal, 409 F.
App'x 356 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (per curiam); United
States ex rel. Mergent Servs. v. Flaherty, 540 F.3d 89,
92-94 (2nd Cir. 2008); Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d
870, 873-74 (11th Cir. 2008); Rogers v. Sacramento
Cty., 293 F. App'x 466, 467 (9th Cir. 2008);
United States ex rel. Brooks v. Lockheed Martin
Corp., 237 F. App'x 802, 803 (4th Cir. 2007) (per
curiam); Brantley v. Title First Titling Agency, No.
1:12-cv-608, 2012 WL 6725592, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 27,
2012); Carter v. Washtenaw Cty., No. 09-14994, 2010
WL 3222042, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 13, 2010).
because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se in this
action, he is prohibited from bringing an FCA claim, and the
complaint will be dismissed.