United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Owensboro
DEANGELO M. PARKS, JR. PLAINTIFF
RON HERRINGTON DEFENDANT
H. McKinley, Jr., Chief Judge.
a civil rights action brought by a pretrial detainee pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has granted Plaintiff
Deangelo M. Parks, Jr., leave to proceed in forma
pauperis. This matter is before the Court for screening
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and McGore v.
Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997),
overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 594
U.S. 199 (2007). For the reasons set forth below, the action
will be dismissed.
SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT
brings this action against Henderson County Detention Center
(HCDC) Jailer Ron Herrington in his official capacity. In his
complaint, Plaintiff alleges that his constitutional rights
have been violated by various conditions of confinement at
HCDC. For example, Plaintiff alleges that since he has been
housed at HCDC, he has twice been served moldy bread. He also
complains that a “sewage/waste smell” permeates
HCDC at times and that this smell causes him to suffer from
dizziness, stomachaches, and headaches. Plaintiff also
alleges that his clothing has come back from the laundry
“wet and with mildew smell.” Plaintiff further
states that HCDC is overcrowded and that he is housed with
inmates “detoxing from hard drugs.” Plaintiff
also complains that he is housed in an area of HCDC that has
no fire sprinklers. Finally, Plaintiff asserts that although
he has filed several complaints regarding these issues, only
some of his complaints have been addressed.
Plaintiff is a prisoner seeking relief against governmental
entities, officers, and/or employees, this Court must review
the instant action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under §
1915A, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss
the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the court
determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v.
Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d at 604. In order to survive
dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded
factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G
Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009)
(citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th
Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). “[A] pro se
complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89
(2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106
(1976)). However, while liberal, this standard of review does
require more than the bare assertion of legal conclusions.
See Columbia Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum,
58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995). The court's duty
“does not require [it] to conjure up unpled
allegations, ” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16,
19 (1st Cir. 1979), or to create a claim for a plaintiff.
Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life Ins. Co.,
518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975). To command otherwise
would require the court “to explore exhaustively all
potential claims of a pro se plaintiff, [and] would
also transform the district court from its legitimate
advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out
the strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a
party.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d
1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
only relief Plaintiff seeks in his complaint is transfer to
another facility. However, the law is clear that inmates have
no constitutional right to be incarcerated in any particular
institution. Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236
(1976); Beard v. Livesay, 798 F.2d 874, 876 (6th
Cir. 1986). In addition, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate
any state-created liberty interest in being transferred
because, in Kentucky, the transfer of prisoners is within the
discretion of the corrections cabinet. See Ky. Rev.
Stat. § 197.065. Thus, a federal court only has the
authority to order a State to transfer a prisoner in the rare
and extreme situations where an inmate's life is in
imminent or grave danger. For example, in Streeter v.
Hopper, the Fifth Circuit held that a district court
could order the transfer of two inmates who had presented
evidence that their lives were in grave danger and that their
present state facility was unable to adequately guarantee
their safety. 618 F.2d 1178, 1182 (5th Cir. 1980). Similarly,
in Walker v. Lockhart, the Eighth Circuit held that
a district court could order that an inmate be transferred to
another institution where the inmate, who had murdered a
police officer, presented evidence that the warden at his
current facility had threatened his life. 713 F.2d 1378, 1383
(8th Cir. 1983); see also Moore v. Schuetzle, 486
F.Supp.2d 969, 981 (D.N.D. 2007) (“The administration
of prisons, including particularly state prisons, is
generally not within the province of the court, [except] in
rare and extreme cases . . .”).
Court finds that Plaintiff's allegations do not suggest
such a rare and extreme situation at HCDC that this Court
would order a transfer. Thus, Plaintiff's complaint must
be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted. See, e.g., Wheeler v.
Melanson, No. 15-2419 SECTION P, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
67976 (W.D. La. Mar. 14, 2016) (dismissing prisoner §
1983 conditions-of-confinement action on initial review for
failure to state a claim upon relief could be granted because
the only relief inmate sought was transfer to another
foregoing reasons, this action will be dismissed ...