United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Owensboro
HUBERT L. McGUIRE PLAINTIFF
COMMONWEATLH ATTORNEY et al. DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
H. McKinley, Jr., United States District Court Chief Judge
Hubert L. McGuire, a pretrial detainee currently incarcerated
in the Henderson County Detention Center (HCDC), filed a
pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(DN 1). This matter is before the Court on initial screening
of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the
reasons that follow, the Court will dismiss a portion of the
claims and allow Plaintiff to amend other claims.
SUMMARY OF CLAIMS
brings this action against the Henderson County
“Commonwealth Attorney” and the Henderson City
Police Department (HCPD) in their individual and official
statement of the case, Plaintiff alleges as follows:
I. On or around April 7th 2016, I was racially profiled by
the Henderson City Policy Dept. and the Commonwealth
Attorney's Office. I was charged with drug trafficking
without sufficient evidence or witnesses. I was in Jail from
April 7th until September 12, 2016 when the case was
dismissed with prejuice because commonwealth had no evidence.
II. This has cost me my apartment, mental anguish, I have no
stability. Lost my disability check. I have no income or
place to live. III. Through this entire process no evidence
was ever produced to even hold me in jail. They had plenty of
chances to dismiss this case months ago but they didn't.
Now this case has been dismissed I feel like I should be
rewarded the amount I stated. this is clearly a violation of
my civil rights. And you can see that I was profiled because
the color of my skin.
relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages in the amount of
“1000 per day in detention”; punitive damages in
the amount of $250, 000; and injunctive relief in the form of
“release from illegal detention.”
Plaintiff is a prisoner seeking relief against governmental
entities, officers, and/or employees, this Court must review
the instant action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under §
1915A, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss
the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the court
determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v.
Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997),
overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549
U.S. 199 (2007).
is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either
in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 325 (1989). The trial court may, therefore, dismiss a
claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably
meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are
clearly baseless. Id. at 327.
order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim,
“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and
(2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.”
Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d
478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v.
Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations
omitted)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.' Nor does a
complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked
assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
courts are to hold pro se pleadings “to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,
” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), this
duty to be less stringent “does not require us to
conjure up unpled allegations, ” McDonald v.
Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979), or to create a
claim for a plaintiff. Clark v. Nat'l
Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir.
1975). To command otherwise would require courts “to
explore exhaustively all potential claims of a pro
se plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district
court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role
of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most
successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v.
City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).