United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Paducah
TORI T. CURTIS PLAINTIFF
MICHAEL T. BRADFORD et al . DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
N. Stivers, Judge United States District Court
matter is before the Court upon three motions filed by
pro se Plaintiff Tori T. Curtis - a motion
requesting that his complaint not be dismissed (DN 31); a
motion “to be able to sue defendants in their official
capacity” (DN 34); and a motion to supplement his
complaint (DN 35). The Court will consider each of these
motions in turn.
is a convicted prisoner incarcerated at Kentucky State
Penitentiary (KSP). He initiated this 42 U.S.C. § 1983
action on April 25, 2016, by filing suit against four KSP
officials in both their individual and official capacities.
Upon its initial review of Plaintiff's complaint and
first amended complaint, the Court dismissed Plaintiff's
official and individual-capacity claims against every
Defendant except Defendant Bradford, against whom the Court
allowed an individual-capacity retaliation claim to proceed.
then filed a second amended complaint against the same
Defendants (DN 23). The Court conducted its screening of this
amended complaint on December 15, 2016, and allowed
Plaintiff's newly stated retaliation claims to proceed
against the other three Defendants - Defendants Warden White,
Paris, and Morrison (DN 27).
MOTION REQUESTING THAT COMPLAINT NOT BE DISMISSED (DN
Plaintiff's first motion, he states as follows: “I
realize that my 21 days has past to respond on the defendant
asking that the complaint be dismissed.” He then
explains that he did not timely respond to Defendants'
“motion” because he was placed in protective
custody for several days and did not have access to his legal
materials. However, a review of the record reveals that
Defendants have not filed a motion to dismiss or any other
motion. For this reason, Plaintiff's motion requesting
that his complaint not be dismissed will be denied as moot.
MOTION TO SUE DEFENDANTS IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES (DN
motion, Plaintiff asks the Court to allow him to sue the
named Defendants in their official capacities. Thus, it is
essentially a motion to reconsider the Court's first
initial review in which it dismissed the official-capacity
claims against all Defendants.
Court may reconsider interlocutory orders under either
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) or its inherent, common
law authority to control the administration of the case
before it. Rodriguez v. Tenn. Laborers Health &
Welfare Fund, 89 F. App'x 949, 959 (6th Cir. 2004);
Mallory v. Eyrich, 922 F.2d 1273, 1282 (6th Cir.
1991); see also Simmerman v. Ace Bayou Corp., 304
F.R.D. 516, 518 (E.D. Ky. 2015). Reconsideration of an
interlocutory order is appropriate where “there is (1)
an intervening change of controlling law; (2) new evidence
available; or (3) a need to correct a clear error or prevent
manifest injustice.” Louisville/ Jefferson Cty.
Metro Gov't v. Hotels.com, L.P., 590 F.3d 381, 389
(6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Rodriguez, 89 F. App'x
at 959) (internal quotation marks omitted). The standard
vests the Court with “significant discretion.”
Rodriguez, 89 F. App'x at 959 n.7.
seems to argue that the Court's decision dismissing his
official-capacity claims constitutes a “manifest
injustice.” He writes:
[The Defendants'] employer “Department of
Corrections” has trained all of the Defendants to do
their jobs and to be able to make professional decisions, to
see what is right an what is wrong, what to write up an
inmate for and what doesn't need to be wrote up. After
these individuals has been trained an hired “Department
of Corrections” is left with the decision if they feel
or think this person is professional or not. So it makes
those head-over Department of Corrections a participant!! . .
. I am asking the Court to please allow me to sue all of the
Defendants in their official capacity which their employer is
those over D.O.C. “Department of Corrections.” .
. . . I the Plaintiff do respectfully ask the Court have all
of the defendants and the head of Department of Corrections
to each pay for all of the pain inflicted on me an them
violating my constitutional rights. . . .
despite Plaintiff's allegations and argument regarding
the Kentucky Department of Corrections and his desire to sue
the four Defendants in their official capacities, the law
simply does not permit such. As the Court explained in its
first initial review (DN 15), because all Defendants are
employees or officers of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, the
claims brought against them in their official capacities are
deemed claims against the Commonwealth of Kentucky. See
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). State
officials sued in their official capacities for money damages
are not “persons” subject to suit under §
1983. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491
U.S. 58, 71 (1989). In addition, the Eleventh Amendment acts
as a bar to claims for monetary damages against state
officials in their official capacities. Kentucky v.
Graham, 473 U.S. at 169. Thus, because Plaintiff seeks
only monetary damages, the Court finds that his
official-capacity claims against all Defendants were properly
dismissed, and that his motion for reconsideration must be
MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT ...