United States District Court, E.D. Kentucky, Northern Division, Ashland
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
R. Wilhoit, Jr. United States District Judge.
John Everett Carr is confined at the Federal Correctional
Institution in Ashland, Kentucky. Proceeding without an
attorney, Carr has filed an original and supplemental
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241, as well as a narrative description of the
pertinent facts. [D. E. Nos. 1, 4, 5]
November 21, 2013, a federal grand jury sitting in London,
Kentucky issued an indictment charging Carr and four others
with conspiracy to own, operate, maintain and control a chop
shop in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2322, 371, and
related offenses. While Carr was arrested for his initial
arraignment on December 13, 2013, he was immediately released
from federal custody subject to several conditions.
4, 2014, Carr reached a plea agreement with the government
with respect to his federal charges. State court records show
that on June 30, 2014, a grand jury in Whitley County,
Kentucky issued an indictment charging Carr with first degree
trafficking in a controlled substance in violation of Ky.
Rev. Stat. 218A.1412. Commonwealth v, Carr,
No. 14-CR-186 (Whitley Co. 2014). See
18&court=l & division=CI&caseNumber=
14-CR-Q0186&caseTypeCode=CR&client id=0 (last
visited on February 2, 2017). In his petition, Carr states
that Kentucky police arrested him on July 23, 2014 on these
charges, and he was confined at the Whitley County Jail. Carr
alleges that on July 24, 2014, the federal government lodged
a detainer with the county jail related to the pending
alleges that on July 28, 2014, he was granted release on bond
in Case No. 14-CR-186, but remained in jail because of the
federal detainer. On August 18, 2014, Carr was arraigned on
his state drug trafficking charges. On the same day, he was
arraigned in Whitley District Court on charges of Theft by
Unlawful Taking -Auto in Commonwealth v. Carr, No.
14-F-280 (Whitley Co. 2014). See https://kcoj
id=0 (last visited on February 2, 2017). In Case No.
14-F-280, Carr asserts that he was granted bond on August 21,
2014, and the charges were later dismissed on October 20,
was taken into federal custody pursuant to a writ of habeas
corpus ad prosequendum on October 28, 2014. On March
19, 2015, Carr was sentenced to a 36-month term of
incarceration in United States v. Carr, No. 6:
13-CR-44-GFVT-3 (E.D.- Ky, 2013). After his federal sentence
was imposed, Can* was returned to state custody on March 23,
2015. On April 20, 2015, the Whitley Circuit Court sentenced
Can* to an 18-month prison term in Case No, 14-CR-186 to be
served concurrently with his federal sentence. On June 8,
2015, Carr was paroled from this sentence, and was released
into federal custody to begin his federal sentence with the
Bureau of Prisons. [D.E.No. 4-1 at 3]
March 2016, Carr filed a motion in his federal criminal case
to compel the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") to
recalculate his prior custody credits. The Court denied
relief on July 29, 2016, directing Carr to first file inmate
grievances with the prison and, if unsatisfied, seek relief
under § 2241. However, Can* had already started that
process by filing an inmate grievance on May 12, 2016,
although he was unable to obtain relief from either the
warden or the BOP's regional office. [D. E. No. 4-1 at
2-9] Can* filed an appeal to the BOP's Central Office on
July 12, 2016 [D. E. No. 5-1 at 1], but before receiving a
response, filed this action two weeks later seeking habeas
relief from the BOP's preliminary determination that his
prior custody credits had been properly calculated. [D. E.
BOP's Central Office denied relief on September 12, 2016,
for essentially the same reasons as the warden and the
regional office. In doing so, it noted that Kentucky had
given Carr credit towards his state sentences from July 23,
2014, through December 15, 2014, and from March 25, 2015,
through June 8, 2015. The BOP awarded Carr credit towards his
federal sentence from December 16, 2014 until March 24, 2015,
as Kentucky had not credited that period against his state
sentences. [D.E.No. 5-1 at 2-3]
Carr did not completely exhaust his administrative remedies
until after he filed his petition, the Court adheres to its
prior conclusion that Carr substantially exhausted his
administrative remedies prior to filing suit and that there
is an adequate record upon which to reach a decision.
Therefore, under the unique circumstances of this case, the
Court concludes that the purposes of the exhaustion
requirement have been served and will be deemed satisfied.
[D. E. No. 6]
petition, Carr contends that because he was released on bond
on July 28, 2014 in state case No. 14-CR-186 but was retained
in custody solely pursuant to the federal detainer, the
federal government obtained "primary custody" over
him on that date. Therefore, he argues, he is entitled to
prior custody credits pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b)
starting from that date until March 18, 2015, the date his
federal sentence was imposed. [D. E. No. 1 at 3-4, No. 4 at
5] He therefore requests that his federal sentence be deemed
to have commenced on March 19, 2015, with prior custody
credits from July 28, 2014 to March 18, 2015. [D. E. No. 5 at
Court conducts an initial review of habeas corpus petitions.
28 U.S.C. § 2243; Alexander v. Northern Bureau of
Prisons, 419 F.App'x 544, 545 (6th Cir. 2011). A
petition will be denied "if it plainly appears from the
petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not
entitled to relief." Rule 4 of the Rules Governing
§ 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts
(applicable to § 2241 petitions pursuant to Rule 1(b)).
The Court evaluates Carr's petition under a more lenient
standard because he is not represented by an attorney.
Erickson v, Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). At this
stage of the proceedings, the Court accepts the
petitioner's factual allegations as true and construes
all legal claims in his favor. Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007).
of a federal prisoner's sentence, including both its
commencement date and any credits for custody before the
sentence is imposed, is determined by federal statute:
(a) A sentence to a term of imprisonment commences on the
date the defendant is received in custody awaiting
transportation to, or arrives voluntarily to commence service
of sentence at, the official detention facility at which the
sentence is to be served.
(b) A defendant shall be given credit toward the service of a
term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in official
detention prior ...