United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Owensboro
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
H. MCKINLEY, JR. CHIEF JUDGE UNITED STATE DISTRICT JUDGE
a pro se civil rights action brought by a pretrial
detainee pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter is
before the Court for screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915A and McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th
Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v.
Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). For the reasons set forth
below, the action will be allowed to continue in part and
will be dismissed in part.
initially filed this action in the Southern District of
Indiana. It was transferred to this Court on June 6, 2016.
The Court directed Plaintiff to complete and file a
Court-supplied application to proceed in forma
pauperis and a Court-supplied 42 U.S.C. § 1983
complaint form which was to include all the claims he would
like to bring in this action and name all Defendants.
Plaintiff filed his application to proceed in forma
pauperis (DN 18) and his Court-supplied 42 U.S.C. §
1983 complaint form (DN 17) on September 6, 2016. The Court
granted Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma
pauperis on September 12, 2016 (DN 21), but Plaintiff
proceeded to pay the $350.00 filing fee on September 19,
2016. Plaintiff then filed a letter (DN 20), which the Court
construes as an amended complaint. It is Plaintiff's
complaint (DN 17) and amended complaint (DN 20) that are now
before the Court for review.
SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT AND AMENDED COMPLAINT
complaint, Plaintiff states that he is suing the Grayson
County Detention Center (GCDC) and Mrs. Rita Wilson, the
medical supervisor at GCDC, in both her individual and
first alleges that he is served foods at GCDC that he cannot
or should not eat because he has been diagnosed with
diverticulosis. He states that he believes that Defendant
Wilson has been deliberately indifferent to his medical needs
because she refuses to place him on a special diet for
also states that he believes his rights have been violated
based upon the following:
[N]o computer access to research everything about my claims,
dates, etc. This along with my problems with my mail as they
stated I now can no longer receive computer-generated mail
from Sandy Boettcher whom is my only help from the outside. I
cannot provide you with exact dates or the names of persons
responsible as they are unknown to me. There are also other
people in my cell still receiving computer-generated mail
from family members.
relief, Plaintiff states that he is seeking compensatory and
punitive damages and injunctive relief in the form of being
provided dentures, “a diet of foods [he] can eat and
digest properly, a internal medicine doctor, or release from
prison until court dates.”
Plaintiff is a prisoner seeking relief against governmental
entities, officers, and/or employees, this Court must review
the instant action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under §
1915A, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss
the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the court
determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v.
Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d at 604. In order to survive
dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded
factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G
Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009)
(citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th
Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). “[A] pro se
complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89
(2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106
(1976)). However, while liberal, this standard of review does
require more than the bare assertion of legal conclusions.
See Columbia Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum,
58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995). The court's duty
“does not require [it] to conjure up unpled
allegations, ” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16,
19 (1st Cir. 1979), or to create a claim for a plaintiff.
Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life Ins. Co.,
518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975). To command otherwise
would require the court “to explore exhaustively all
potential claims of a pro se plaintiff, [and] would
also transform the district court from its legitimate
advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out
the strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a
party.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d
1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
1983 creates no substantive rights, but merely provides
remedies for deprivations of rights established
elsewhere.” Flint ex rel. Flint v. Ky. Dep't of
Corr., 270 F.3d 340, 351 (6th Cir. 2001). Two elements
are required to state a claim under § 1983. Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980). “[A] plaintiff must
allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution
and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged
deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of
state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 ...