United States District Court, E.D. Kentucky, Southern Division, London
JOSEPH M. KLAKULAK, Petitioner,
SANDRA BUTLER, Warden, Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
C. Reeves, United States District Judge
Klakulak is an inmate confined at the Federal Correctional
Institution in Manchester, Kentucky. Proceeding without an
attorney, Klakulak has filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. [Record No. 1]
Klakulak states that, in February 2015, he was sentenced to a
30-month term of imprisonment. After arriving at FCI -
Manchester, BOP staff allegedly advised Klakulak that he was
eligible for placement in a Residential Reentry Center
(“RRC”), or “halfway house, ” for the
last 90 days of his sentence. Klakulak contends that, without
explanation, when the BOP made this determination, it did not
consider the five factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. §
3621(b) “in good faith, ” did not evaluate those
factors on individualized basis, and abused its discretion
when determining the length of his halfway house placement.
[Record No. 1 at 1-3]
filed an inmate grievance regarding this matter in April
2016. In his extensive response, the warden explained that
the BOP had conducted two separate evaluations regarding
Klakulak's RRC placement in October 2015 and again in
March 2016. In each instance, the BOP considered
Klakulak's specific circumstances when applying the
factors set forth in § 3621(b) and concluded that a
90-day placement was warranted. Specifically, the warden
noted that Klakulak owned a home, was married, had a business
degree, had strong ties in the community, and had an
established employment history. [Record No. 1-1 at 1-11]
Klakulak's appeal to the regional office was denied. He
indicates that the BOP's Central Office had not provided
a decision within the time period permitted by 28 C.F.R.
§ 542.18. [Record No. 1-1 at 12-18]
Court conducts an initial review of habeas corpus petitions.
28 U.S.C. § 2243; Alexander v. Northern Bureau of
Prisons, 419 F. App'x 544, 545 (6th Cir. 2011). A
petition will be denied “if it plainly appears from the
petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not
entitled to relief.” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing
§ 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts
(applicable to § 2241 petitions pursuant to Rule 1(b)).
The Court evaluates ABC's petition under a more lenient
standard because he is not represented by an attorney.
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). At this
stage of the proceedings, the Court accepts the
petitioner's factual allegations as true and construes
all legal claims in his favor. Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007).
Second Chance Act of 2007 increased the maximum term of
halfway house placement for a federal prisoner from six to
twelve months. It requires that the BOP evaluate each
prisoner individually to ensure that such placement is
“of sufficient duration to provide the greatest
likelihood of successful reintegration into the
community.” 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(6)(C). BOP
regulations utilize the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. §
3621(b) when making placement decisions. 28 C.F.R. §
570.22. In addition, 42 U.S.C. § 17541 incentivizes
federal inmates to participate in BOP Inmate Skills
Development programs by giving the BOP the discretion to
consider a longer halfway house placement for participants.
42 U.S.C. § 17541(a)(2)(A).
assertion that the BOP's placement decision is contrary
to 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) suggests, at most, a claim that
its decision was “arbitrary and capricious” in
violation of the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A)-(C). However, the BOP's determinations
regarding halfway house placement are expressly insulated
from judicial review under the APA. 28 U.S.C. § 3625
(“The provisions of sections 554 and 555 and 701
through 706 of title 5, United States Code, do not apply to
the making of any determination, decision, or order under
this subchapter.”). Cf. Woodard v. Quintana,
No. 5:15-307-KKC, 2015 WL 7185478, at *5-6 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 13,
the Court's review is limited to determining whether the
BOP abused its discretion when making its placement decision.
Vasquez v. Strada, 684 F.3d 431, 434 (3d Cir. 2012).
In its decision to place Klakulak in a halfway house for up
to 90 days, the BOP noted Klakulak's home ownership,
marriage, strong community ties, advanced education, and
employment history. All of these factors are relevant under
§ 3621(b). [Record No. 1-1 at 1-11] The record amply
establishes that the BOP did not abuse its discretion in
determining the period of Klakulak's halfway house
placement. Wilson v. Strada, 474 F. App'x 46,
48-49 (3d Cir. 2012) (no abuse of discretion where BOP
expressly considered § 3621(b) factors); Galvin v.
Sepanek, No. 12-CV-119-HRW, 2014 WL 4230467, at *3-4
(E.D. Ky. Aug. 25, 2014) (“analyzing Galvin's
eligibility for RRC placement in accordance with §
3621(b) was all that the BOP was required to do ...”).
on the foregoing analysis, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:
Sandra Butler, Warden of the Federal Correctional Institution
in Manchester, Kentucky, is SUBSTITUTED as the Respondent in
Petitioner Klakulak's petition for a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 [Record No. 1] is
action is DISMISSED and STRICKEN from the Court's docket.
final and appealable Judgment shall be Dated this date.