United States District Court, E.D. Kentucky, Central Division, Frankfort
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Gregory F. Van Tatenhove, United States District Judge
Lee Gamble, Jr., now a resident of Texas City, Texas, has
filed a pro se complaint alleging that in 2002
defendants Kentucky Attorney General Jack Conway,
Commissioner Robert Foster, and the Kentucky Department of
Corrections violated unidentified civil rights by falsely
imprisoning him, and seeks $10 million in damages for
resulting emotional harm. [R. 1.] He has also filed a motion
to proceed in forma pauperis [R. 4], on the wrong
form. Nonetheless, the Court will grant his fee motion for
the limited purpose of conducting the initial screening
required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
Court has noted before,
Gamble has a well-established history as a repetitive and
abusive filer before this Court, and each of the defendants
he has named in his “criminal complaints” was a
named defendant in one or more of several prior civil rights
actions filed by Gamble in an effort to overturn his Kentucky
state convictions. Each case was dismissed by this Court upon
initial screening. Gamble v. Corrections Corp. of
America, No. 7: 12-CV-79-KKC (E.D. Ky. 2012); Gamble
v. Corrections Corp. of America, No. 7: 13-CV-63-ART
(E.D. Ky. 2013); Gamble v. Corrections Corp. of
America, No. 7: 13-CV-82-ART (E.D. Ky. 2013); Gamble
v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, No. 5: 13-CV-308-DCR (E.D.
Ky. 2013); Gamble v. Ky. Dept. of Corr., No. 5:
13-CV-317-KKC (E.D. Ky. 2013); Gamble v. Bottom, No.
5: 13-CV-326-JMH (E.D. Ky. 2013); Gamble v. Conway,
No. 5: 13-CV-327-JMH (E.D. Ky. 2013); Gamble v.
Peckler, No. 5: 13-CV-328-KSF (E.D. Ky. 2013).
Gamble v. Thapar, No. 7: 14-41-KKC (E.D. Ky. 2014).
Since 2010, Gamble has filed nearly fifty habeas corpus
petitions and civil rights actions, nearly all of which have
been promptly and summarily dismissed.
present complaint fares no better. The entirety of his
allegations are that he was “falsely imprisoned”
because the police “violated my rights.” [R. 1 at
4.] Gamble provides no factual basis whatsoever for these
claims, and a complaint which consists entirely of conclusory
statements and legal conclusions fails to state a viable
claim for relief. A complaint must do more: it must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009);
Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470 (6th Cir. 2010).
The Supreme Court has explained that:
While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a
plaintiff's obligation to provide the
“grounds” of his “entitle[ment] to
relief” requires more than labels and conclusions, and
a formulaic recitation of a cause of action's elements
will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption
that all of the complaint's allegations are true.
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007). Simply labeling the defendants' actions -
whatever they might have been - as “wrongful” or
a violation of unidentified civil rights deprives the
defendants of notice of the conduct complained of, a notice
to which they are entitled. Because the complaint does not
provide any factual basis for the claims set forth in the
complaint, it must be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 577 (6th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc.,
859 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir. 1988) (“More than bare
assertions of legal conclusions is ordinarily required to
satisfy federal notice pleading requirements.”)
as with many of Gamble's previously-dismissed cases, his
assertion that he was imprisoned “falsely” is
plainly barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477
(1994). See Gamble v. Corrections Corp. of
America, No. 7: 12-CV-79-KKC (E.D. Ky. 2012). And, to
the extent his claims are not barred by issue preclusion
and/or claim preclusion in light of the repeated dismissal of
his prior complaints, his blank references to a violation of
civil rights beginning in 2002 can be read as asserting a
state law negligence claim or an Eighth Amendment deliberate
indifference claim, but such claims would be plainly
time-barred by Kentucky's one-year statute of
limitations, Ky. Rev. Stat. § 413.140(1)(a).
Mitchell v. Chapman, 343 F.3d 811, 825 (6th Cir.
2003). For these reasons, Gamble's complaint will be
dismissed with prejudice.
and the Court being otherwise sufficiently advised, it is
hereby ORDERED that:
Gamble's motion to proceed in forma pauperis [R.
4] is GRANTED; and
Gamble's complaint [R. 1] is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;
Court will enter an appropriate judgment; and
matter is STRICKEN ...