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Headd v. Hardin County Detention Center

United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville

December 15, 2016

BRIAN HEADD PLAINTIFF
v.
HARDIN COUNTY DETENTION CENTER et al. DEFENDANTS

          MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

          Charles R. Simpson III, Senior Judge

         Plaintiff Brian Headd filed the instant pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action proceeding in forma pauperis. Plaintiff filed his complaint on the Court-approved prisoner § 1983 complaint form. Subsequently, he filed amended complaint (DN 7) on the Court's general complaint form, which the Court construes as a motion to amend the complaint and GRANTS the motion (DN 7). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a).

         The complaint and amended complaint are before the Court on initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons stated below, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's claims upon initial screening.

         I.

         Plaintiff is a convicted inmate at the Hardin County Detention Center (HCDC). He sues the HCDC; HCDC Jailer Danny Allen; Lt. Reynolds, whom Plaintiff identifies as the “Head of Operations” at HCDC; and Corporal Templeman, whom Plaintiff identifies as the “Head of R.C.” at HCDC. He sues Defendants Allen, Reynolds, and Templeman in their official capacities only.

         Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Allen “is allowing his staff to run this jail in a illegal capacity by mixing convicted state inmates with county inmates wich indangers the healt and safty of either one.” He also states, “There are inmates allowed to be with genral population of convicted state and pretrial detainees by medical and operations staff with self admitted dangerous comunical desieses wich may not only harm the inmate but could harm the family of such inmate by accidental contraction of such desiese.” (Emphasis by Plaintiff omitted.)

         Plaintiff further maintains that HCDC “wich runs a Class ‘D' program state and federaly run does not abide by regulation implemented by such agencies.” He states, “If an inmate is to be disciplined than such inmate should be aloud to see a disciplinary board with a staff member and/or paralegal inmate to see charges against such individual and to plead case not just placed on county side and not get a final disposistion.”

         Plaintiff also contends that “all inmates a supposed to be allowed to use a law library not just be allowed to send a request for it not be brought to library now individuals are placed in a position to take bogus plea agreement without the benefit of prepaing/and weighing options.” He also states, “We are not able to file such forms such a post conviction reliefe by ineffective counsle.”

         In the amended complaint, Plaintiff states, “In June 7th day 2016 was brought to county side for violation of contraband without a court call seemed to affect time or detention center said may affect classification even though county inmate doing county time.” He also maintains, “Operations allowing self admitted communical desiessed inmat H.I.V. in with pre-trial pod's endangering not only inmate but familys of inmates.” Plaintiff also states, “Placing state inmates of floor in boats. Placing state inmates in pre-trial pod's wich can affect outcome of such individual were as county inmate goes home no matter what.”

         As relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages and injunctive relief in the form of “post conviction relief” and transfer out of HCDC.

         II.

         When a prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a governmental entity, officer, or employee, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any portion of it, if the court determines that the complaint is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).

         In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). “But the district court need not accept a ‘bare assertion of legal conclusions.'” Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting Columbia Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.' Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).

         Although this Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991), “[o]ur duty to be ‘less stringent' with pro se complaints does not require us to conjure up unpled allegations.” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation omitted). And this Court is not required to create a claim for Plaintiff. Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975). To command otherwise would require the Court “to explore exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court from its ...


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