United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Bowling Green Division
JOSE CANCHOLA, Sr. ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE ESTATE OF CINDA R. CANCHOLA PLAINTIFF
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security DEFENDANT
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
H.
Brent Brennenstuhl United States Magistrate Judge.
BACKGROUND
Before
the Court is the complaint (DN 1) of Cinda R.
Canchola[1] (''Plaintiff'') seeking
judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Both the Plaintiff (DN
18) and Defendant (DN 19) have filed a Fact and Law Summary.
Pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 73, the parties
have consented to the undersigned United States Magistrate
Judge conducting all further proceedings in this case,
including issuance of a memorandum opinion and entry of
judgment, with direct review by the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals in the event an appeal is filed (DN 11). By Order
entered August 22, 2016 (DN 12), the parties were notified
that oral arguments would not be held unless a written
request therefor was filed and granted. No such request was
filed.
FINDINGS
OF FACT
On
October 18, 2012, Plaintiff filed applications for Disability
Insurance benefits and Supplemental Security Income payments
(Tr. 12, 256-262). Plaintiff alleged that she became disabled
on November 10, 2010 as a result of a mental breakdown,
chronic anxiety, diabetes, diabetic neuropathy, and
hypercalcenia (Tr. 12, 281). On May 26, 2015, Administrative
Law Judge Richard E. Guida (''ALJ'')
conducted a video hearing from Baltimore, Maryland, with
Plaintiff and her counsel participating in Bowling Green,
Kentucky. Also present and testifying was William H. Reed,
Ph.D., a vocational expert.
In a
decision dated June 3, 2015, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff's insured status expired on September 30, 2013
(Tr. 14). The ALJ evaluated Plaintiff's adult disability
claim pursuant to the five-step sequential evaluation process
promulgated by the Commissioner (Tr. 12-20). At the first
step, the ALJ found Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial
gainful activity since November 6, 2010, the alleged onset
date (Tr. 14). At the second step, the ALJ determined that
Plaintiff's COPD, diabetes, neuropathy, and obesity are
''severe'' impairments within the meaning of
the regulations (Id.). The ALJ also determined that
Plaintiff's mental impairment is a
''non-severe'' impairment within the meaning
of the regulations (Tr. 14-16). At the third step, the ALJ
concluded that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one
of the listed impairments in Appendix 1 (Id.).
At the
fourth step, the ALJ found Plaintiff has the residual
functional capacity to perform less than a full range of
light work because she can only perform postural activities;
can never use ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; and must avoid
concentrated exposure to vibrations, fumes, odors, dusts,
gases, poor ventilation, and hazards (Tr. 16). Relying on
testimony from the vocational expert, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff is unable to perform any of her past relevant work
(Tr. 18).
The ALJ
proceeded to the fifth step where he considered
Plaintiff's residual functional capacity, age, education,
and past work experience as well as testimony from the
vocational expert (Tr. 18-19). The ALJ found that Plaintiff
is capable of performing a significant number of jobs that
exist in the national economy (Id.). Therefore, the
ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has not been under a
''disability, '' as defined in the Social
Security Act, from November 6, 2010, through the date of the
decision (Tr. 19).
Plaintiff
timely filed a request for the Appeals Council to review the
ALJ's decision (Tr. 7-8). The Appeals Council denied
Plaintiff's request for review of the ALJ's decision
(Tr. 1-4).
CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW
Standard
of Review
Review
by the Court is limited to determining whether the findings
set forth in the final decision of the Commissioner are
supported by ''substantial evidence, '' 42
U.S.C. § 405(g); Cotton v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d
692, 695 (6th Cir. 1993); Wyatt v. Sec'y of Health
& Human Servs., 974 F.2d 680, 683 (6th Cir. 1992),
and whether the correct legal standards were applied.
Landsaw v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs.,
803 F.2d 211, 213 (6th Cir. 1986). ''Substantial
evidence exists when a reasonable mind could accept the
evidence as adequate to support the challenged conclusion,
even if that evidence could support a decision the other
way.'' Cotton, 2 F.3d at 695 (quoting
Casey v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 987
F.2d 1230, 1233 (6th Cir. 1993)). In reviewing a case for
substantial evidence, the Court ''may not try the
case de novo, nor resolve conflicts in evidence, nor
decide questions of credibility.'' Cohen v.
Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 964 F.2d 524,
528 (6th Cir. 1992) (quoting Garner v. Heckler, 745
F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984)).
As
previously mentioned, the Appeals Council denied
Plaintiff's request for review of the ALJ's decision
(Tr. 1-4). At that point, the ALJ's decision became the
final decision of the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. ''
404.955(b), 404.981, 422.210(a); see 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(h) (finality of the Commissioner's decision).
Thus, the Court will be reviewing the decision of the ALJ,
not the Appeals Council, and the evidence that was in the
administrative record when the ALJ rendered the decision. 42
U.S.C. § 405(g); 20 ...