United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Paducah Division
LIFE CARE CENTERS OF AMERICA, INC. et al., Plaintiffs,
THE ESTATE OF FRANCES M. NEBLETT, et al., Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
THOMAS B. RUSSELL, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court upon Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. (Docket #5). Plaintiffs have responded. (Docket #6). This matter is ripe for adjudication. For the following reasons, the Court will DENY Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. (Docket #5).
Frances M. Neblett was a resident of Parkview Nursing and Rehabilitation Center ("Parkview") from November 12 to November 17, 2013. As part of the check-in process, Neblett signed an agreement to submit all disputes to arbitration. (Docket #1). While at Parkview, Neblett allegedly "suffered physical and emotional injuries due to inadequate care" which resulted in her death. (Docket #5).
On May 21, 2014, Neblett's estate and Neblett's spouse, Floyd Neblett, filed a state action in McCracken County against Life Care Centers of America, Inc. ("Life Care"), Consolidated Resources Health Care Fund I, L.P. ("Consolidated Resources"), and Lori Moberly, the administrator of Parkview.
On June 25, 2014, Life Care and Consolidated Resources filed the present action against Neblett's estate and Floyd Neblett. Life Care and Consolidated seek to enjoin the state court action and to compel arbitration. Moberly is not a party to this action. Moberly is a resident of Kentucky, as are Defendants in this case. Life Care and Consolidated Resources are organized and have their principal place of business in Tennessee.
Life Care and Consolidated seek to enjoin Defendants' state court action and compel arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"). 9 U.S.C. § 4. Defendants move the Court to dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint for (I) lack of subject matter jurisdiction, (II) failure to join a necessary party, (III) request the Court to abstain from exercising jurisdiction; and (IV) dismiss the complaint because the arbitration agreement is invalid and unenforceable.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) provides that a party may file a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. "Subject matter jurisdiction is always a threshold determination, " Am. Telecom Co. v. Republic of Lebanon, 501 F.3d 534, 537 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 101 (1998)), and "may be raised at any stage in the proceedings, " Shultz v. Gen. R.V. Ctr., 512 F.3d 754, 756 (6th Cir. 2008). Where subject matter jurisdiction is challenged pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of proving jurisdiction in order to survive the motion. Moir v. Greater Cleveland Reg'l Transit Auth., 895 F.2d 266, 269 (6th Cir. 1990) (citing Rogers v. Stratton Indus., Inc., 798 F.2d 913, 915 (6th Cir. 1986)); see also DLX, Inc. v. Kentucky, 381 F.3d 511, 516 (6th Cir. 2004). "If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3); see also Bauer v. RBX Indus. Inc., 368 F.3d 569 (6th Cir. 2004). A federal district court has original diversity jurisdiction over an action between citizens of different states and where the amount in controversy exceeds $75, 000, exclusive of interest and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that pleadings, including complaints, contain a "short plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). A defendant may move to dismiss a claim or case because the complaint fails to "state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must presume all of the factual allegations in the complaint are true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Total Benefits Planning Agency, Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 552 F.3d 430, 434 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Great Lakes Steel v. Deggendorf, 716 F.2d 1101, 1105 (6th Cir. 1983)). "The court need not, however, accept unwarranted factual inferences." Id. (citing Morgan v. Church's Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir. 1987)).
Even though a "complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). Instead, the plaintiff's "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Id. (citations omitted). A complaint should contain enough facts "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570. A claim becomes plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). If, from the well-pleaded facts, the court cannot "infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but has not show[n]' - that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Id. at 1950 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). "Only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss." Id.
I. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction.
Defendants argue that this case should be dismissed because this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. Federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over federal question cases and diversity cases between citizens of different states where the amount in controversy exceeds $75, 000. 28 USCS §§ 1331, 1332. The parties agree that federal question is not ...