United States District Court, E.D. Kentucky, Southern Division, London
HANLY A. INGRAM, Magistrate Judge.
The Court, on referral (D.E. 455), considers reported violations of supervised release conditions by Defendant Rodney Bishop. District Judge Van Tatenhove entered a judgment against Defendant on November 17, 2010, for conspiracy to manufacture a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine, conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine, and possession of pseudoephedrine to manufacture methamphetamine. D.E. 342. Defendant was sentenced to 70 months of imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release. Id. Defendant began his supervised release term on March 6, 2014.
On August 26, 2014, the United States Probation Office ("USPO") issued a Supervised Release Violation Report. The Report charges, in Violation #1, a violation of Standard Condition #2, which provides that "[t]he defendant shall report to the probation office and shall submit a truthful and complete written report within the first five days of each month." Specifically, the Report states that Defendant did not submit his monthly reports for the months of May, June or July 2014. The Report also charges, in Violation #2, a violation of Standard Condition #6, which states that "[t]he defendant shall notify the probation officer at least ten days prior to any change in residence or employment." The Report specifically alleges that Defendant consistently reported to the USPO that he was living with his father. On August 21, 2014, however, the USPO was advised by Defendant's father that Defendant had not been living at his father's residence for some time and that Defendant had been fired from his job. According to the Report, Defendant had not informed the USPO of the change in residence or lack of employment.
The Report further charges, in Violation #3, a violation of a Condition of Supervision that requires the Defendant to pay restitution in minimum monthly installments of $50. The Report states that Defendant "has not made a restitution payment since April 2014." In Violation #4, the Report charges Defendant with violating Standard Condition #7, which requires that "[t]he defendant shall refrain from excessive use of alcohol and shall not purchase, possess, use, distribute, or administer any controlled substance or any paraphernalia related to any controlled substances, except as prescribed by a physician." On August 22, 2014, the Report states that Defendant's urine tested positively for methamphetamine and suboxone (buprenorphine), but he denied use of drugs when confronted with the results. However, on a subsequent home visit Defendant admitted to the use of methamphetamine and suboxone (buprenorphine). The Report reasons that, as methamphetamine and suboxone are controlled substances, and Defendant has prior drug convictions, pursuant to Sixth Circuit case law holding that the use of a controlled substance is the equivalent of possessing the controlled substance, possession of either drug constitutes a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a), a Class E Felony. This conduct forms the basis of Violation #5, a violation of the Supervised Release Condition requiring Defendant to not commit another federal, state or local crime.
The Court conducted an initial appearance pursuant to Rule 32.1 on September 3, 2014, and set a final hearing following a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of the right to a preliminary hearing. D.E. 455. At the initial appearance, the United States made an oral motion for interim detention, and Defendant did not object. Id. The Court found that detention was appropriate as Defendant did not carry the heavy release burden imposed upon him under Rule 32.1(a)(6) and 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a). Id.
At the scheduled final hearing on September 11, 2014, Defendant was afforded all rights due under Rule 32.1 and 18 U.S.C. § 3583. D.E. 459. Defendant competently entered a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent stipulation to the charged violations. Id. Further, for purposes of Rule 32.1 proceedings, Defendant admitted the factual basis for the violations, as described in the Report. Id. In the Supervised Release context, the Sixth Circuit treats controlled substance use as equivalent to possession. See United States v. Crace, 207 F.3d 833, 836 (6th Cir. 2000). The United States thus established Violations #1-5 under the standard of § 3583(e). The parties disputed the proper sentence for Defendant's violations of his release conditions.
Counsel for the United States requested a substantial term of imprisonment based upon the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553. Relying on Defendant's criminal history, danger to the public and Defendant's lack of respect for the law, Counsel for the United States advocated for a 16 month sentence followed by a period of supervised release for three years.
Defense counsel compared Defendant's range to hypothetical Guidelines ranges that could apply if the underlying conduct that caused the violation was treated as a new criminal offense and subject to the Guidelines amendments to be effective on November 1, 2014. This analogy had low base offense levels and therefore had a significantly shorter sentencing range than provided by the Revocation Table in Chapter 7 of the Guidelines. Further, defense counsel argued that by stipulating to the charged violations and the underlying conduct, Defendant should receive credit for acceptance of responsibility for his actions. Defense counsel requested a sentence of thirty days followed by a period of supervised release for three years, to include increased drug testing and inpatient substance abuse treatment. As the hearing developed, defense counsel added a request for placement in a halfway house to provide transitional stability to Defendant upon release from prison.
The Court has evaluated the entire record, including the Supervised Release Violation Report and accompanying documents, and the sentencing materials from the underlying Judgment in this District. Additionally, the Court has considered all the § 3553 factors imported into the § 3583(e) analysis. Under § 3583(e)(3), a defendant's maximum penalty for a supervised release violation hinges on the gravity of the underlying offenses of the conviction. Defendant's convictions pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 846 and § 841, with penalties pursuant to § 841(b)(1)(C), were Class C felonies. See 21 U.S.C. § 841; 18 U.S.C. § 3559. For a Class C felony, the maximum revocation sentence provided under § 3583 is two years of imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). The Policy Statements in Chapter 7 of the Guidelines provide advisory imprisonment ranges for revocation premised on criminal history (at the time of original sentencing) and the "grade" of the particular violation proven. See United States v. Perez-Arellano, 212 F.Appx. 436, 438-39 (6th Cir. 2007) ("Although the policy statements found in Chapter Seven of the United States Sentencing Guidelines recommend ranges of imprisonment, U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4, such statements are merely advisory' and need only be considered by the district court before sentence is imposed.") (citation omitted). Under § 7B1.1, Defendant's admitted conduct would qualify as Grade C violations with respect to Violations #1, #2, #3 and #4, and a Grade B violation with respect to Violation #5. Given Defendant's criminal history category of IV (the category at the time of the conviction in this District) and a Grade B violation, see U.S.S.G § 7B1.2(b) ("Where there is more than one violation of the conditions of supervision, or the violation includes conduct that constitutes more than one offense, the grade of the violation is determined by the violation having the most serious grade."), Defendant's range, under the Revocation Table of Chapter 7, is 12 to 18 months.
Congress does mandate revocation in a case of this nature. By statute, the Court must revoke Defendant's release because he possessed a controlled substance. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g)(1); see also Crace, 207 F.3d at 836 (equating use with possession). The Sixth Circuit clearly and repeatedly has equated drug use with drug possession, and Defendant's admitted use in this context undoubtedly results in application of § 3583(g)(1). See United States v. Metcalf, 292 F.Appx. 447, 450 n.2 (6th Cir. 2008) ("Mandatory revocation was...warranted under § 3583(g)(1), as we have held that use of a controlled substance constitutes possession under that subsection."). The only exception would be if a suitable treatment option, or Defendant's record of involvement in treatment, warranted relief. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d); Crace, 207 F.3d at 835 (holding district court "required by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g) to revoke the defendant's term of supervised release upon the defendant's positive drug test and admission of the use of a controlled substance unless defendant could come under the exception in 18 U.S.C § 3583(d)"). Defendant did not argue for the application of this exception, and it is not supported by this record.
The nature and circumstances of Defendant's underlying conviction are very serious. While Defendant did not return to dealing drugs while on supervision, he has resumed using drugs, and when he is using drugs, his history shows an increased likelihood of dangerous criminal conduct. Further, this case illustrates many of the societal harms attendant to drug trafficking. The underlying offense conduct in this case shows the realization of that risk in the form of intoxicated driving, use of weapons, theft, involvement of children as "lookouts" to protect wrongdoing, and threats against potential witnesses. This risk of harm is clearly not only to himself, but to those around him, and the public at large.
Defendant's history and characteristics, the need to deter criminal conduct, and the need to protect the public are significant drivers in the Court's analysis that all point to one primary goal: getting Defendant to remain clean. If Defendant can remain clean, he will be able to put his criminal history behind him and become a productive member of the community. However, if Defendant is unable to do this, as his past as shown, he will remain highly dangerous to himself, those around him, and the public.
Substance abuse treatment is needed, but has not been successful in the past so as to eliminate the need for a significant prison term. While in state custody in 2008, Defendant failed to complete a court ordered inpatient drug treatment program. He also failed to complete the Bureau of Prisons Residential Drug Abuse Program ("RDAP") while incarcerated pursuant to the Judgment in this case. RDAP was Defendant's best chance to learn new behaviors and skills to remain clean.
The need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have committed similar violations is addressed by the recommendation of a sentence within ...