United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville Division
DAHVED M. LILLACALENIA. Plaintiff,
KIT FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, Defendant.
JOHN G. HEYBURN, II, Senior District Judge.
Plaintiff Dahved M. Lillacalenia, a Kentucky resident who is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed suit against Kit Federal Credit Union, with its office located in Kentucky. This matter is before the Court for screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). For the reasons set forth below, the action will be dismissed.
I. STATEMENT OF CLAIMS
On the complaint form, as grounds for filing this case in federal court, Plaintiff indicates: "Violation to Constitutional Rights Sections: 1-2 & 11 Abuse of Pub trust (KRS 522.050) - (KRS.522.040)-(522.050) Violation to USC Sec(s): 12 USC 504 & 505-18 USC 892 thru 894 Amendment #1." On his attached civil cover sheet, he cites to "18 USC § 656" for "Illegal Banking/Non Requested Service."
Plaintiff reports that he opened an account with Kit Credit Union for himself and his father, over whom he had "POA" (presumably standing for power of attorney). He states that after his father's death, the accounts "were negative in balance by Kit, - As Kit stated that they sent monies back to SSI Leaving the Plaintiff's account in a state which he owes the Bank Due to there unrequested loan of funds." He continues that the "entity which Kit Depleated the Account for was prviously contacted with a Letter of Explination - And Kit should had not Released Any funds or controlled the Plaintiff's personal and fathers funds, with out request of that Kind of assistance." Plaintiff claims that he had "$140.00 of personal funds confiscated by the Bank, not the Gov. - Kit is not a Gov. entity. The Account is in the Negative $600. In the negative Due to Kit's Actions."
As relief, Plaintiff requests an apology and return of "personal funds" and seeks $500, 000.00 "or what the Courts find lawful as resolve for violations." He also asks that Kit be informed that "Checking and Saving's Accounts are not in lue of Loaning Services which are not requested" and be informed that "the situation was under controll with out their asistance."
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The federal in forma pauperis statute mandates that a trial court shall dismiss a civil action at any time, if the court determines that an action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The trial court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Id. at 327.
In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "[A] district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true." Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). "A pleading that offers labels and conclusions' or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.' Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertion[s]' devoid of further factual enhancement.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
Although courts are to hold pro se pleadings "to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, " Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), this duty to be less stringent "does not require us to conjure up unpled allegations, " McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979), or to create a claim for a plaintiff. Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975). To command otherwise would require courts "to explore exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party." Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
A. Federal-law claims
12 U.S.C. §§ 504-505