United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville
JOHN G. HEYBURN, Senior District Judge.
The petitioner, Tywan Monta Beaumont, filed this pro se action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 seeking a writ of habeas corpus. The Court reviewed his petition under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. Upon review, the Court directed Beaumont to show cause why his petition should not be dismissed as barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Beaumont did not file a response to the Show Cause Order. Upon review, for the reasons set forth below, the Court will dismiss the petition as untimely.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Based on the petition and exhibits, Beaumont was convicted in Jefferson Circuit Court by a jury of complicity to murder, complicity to robbery in the first degree, complicity to assault in the second degree, and complicity to tampering with physical evidence. He was sentenced to fifty years imprisonment. He appealed his conviction to the Kentucky Supreme Court. On October 1, 2009, that court reversed his conviction for tampering with physical evidence and affirmed it on the other counts. Beaumont filed a motion to vacate the judgment under Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42 on September 29, 2010. The motion was denied on October 6, 2011. He appealed the denial of his RCr 11.42 motion, and the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the denial on November 9, 2012. Beaumont field the instant § 2254 petition on November 25, 2013.
Because Beaumont's petition was filed after April 24, 1996, the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), the provisions of the AEDPA apply. Washington v. Hofbauer , 228 F.3d 689, 698 (6th Cir. 2000). The AEDPA sets forth a statute of limitations for state prisoners seeking release from custody. The statute provides as follows:
(d)(1) - A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of -
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) and (2).
In the present case, Beaumont's conviction became final, for purposes of the AEDPA's statute-of-limitations period, on December 30, 2009, ninety days after entry of the Kentucky Supreme Court opinion on October 1, 2009, on the last date a petition for writ of certiorari could have been filed in the United States Supreme Court. See Jimenez v. Quarterman , 555 U.S. 113, 119 (2009) ("As a result, direct review cannot conclude for purposes of § 2244(d)(1)(A) until the availability of direct appeal to the state courts and to this Court has been exhausted.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Hill v. Dailey , ...