United States District Court, E.D. Kentucky, Northern Division, Ashland
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
HENRY R. WILHOIT, Jr., District Judge.
This matter is before the Court upon Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint [Docket No. 14]. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not stated a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Plaintiff began her employment as a Housekeeper for Holiday Inn Express & Suites in Ashland, Kentucky on October 10, 2011. Her employment was terminated on December 31, 2012. In her Complaint, she asserts claims for sexual harassment, discrimination and retaliation, presumably pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Attached to her Complaint is copy of a Charge of Discrimination filed by Plaintiff against her employer with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), alleging retaliation, pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.  [Docket No. 1-2]. In her Complaint, Plaintiff states that she was talking to a coworker regarding hours when someone named Missy Davis called her into the office and "blew up on her." (Docket No. 1 at p. 1). She claims that Davis did not speak to someone named Linda who was complaining about not getting enough hours as well. Id. She claims that when she left the office a woman named Christine, who was a friend of Davis', kept asking her how she was doing and if she felt ok. Id. Plaintiff alleges that she checked on a room and came down the hall when Chrissy "made 90 mile/hr with her cart as if to hit me." Id. Plaintiff states that she "placed a hand on her back and said I'm sorry for getting in your way after all you are the eyes & ears of the building Missy Davis would fall apart without you." Id. Plaintiff claims that Chrissy turned it around and said that Plaintiff followed her into a room, grabbed her rear and said something that Lacy Stevens (the General Manager) and Missy Davis still haven't informed her of. Id. She then alleges, "Missy had me in the office again, we had a talk I told them it's something I disapprove of." Id. She was told to come back the following day and talk to Peri & Bharma Thackor who did not appear. Id. She claims that Lacy and Missy "let her go" and she refused to sign a "writeup" for something she didn't do. Id. Plaintiff then claims that she was asked to sign a different "writeup" for telling a lady named Miranda "you new girls need to start stocking carts, " an issue which occurred before the referenced issue. Id. at p. 2. She then claims that she was "falsely accused of something I didn't due [sic] and fired." Id.
In her Complaint, Plaintiff further claims that a person named April Neal admitted to smoking "pot" "on the lot" with other housekeepers named Suzy and Teresa Bradley, but they were not fired or reported to authorities. Id.
She also claims that she became tired of "homosexuality being advertised to me." Id. Plaintiff stated, "I feel I've been sexually harassed, by all the talk, I'd have to take my lunch breaks in my car it's all they want to talk about. I feel I deserve a lawsuit. I overheard a sexual conversation between Missy & Chrissy." Id.
Defendant seeks dismissal of all claims alleged herein.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Dismissal of a complaint is warranted under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. With respect to a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals explained in Estate of Ezra G. Smith v. United States, 509 Fed.Appx. 436 (6th Cir. 2012):
[t]he Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) that to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) a complaint must contain (1) enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible; (2) more than a formulaic recitation of a cause of actions' elements; and (3) allegations that suggest a right to relief above a speculative level. (internal citation omitted)... A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. (internal citation omitted)... For a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory factual content and the reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling a plaintiff to relief. (internal citation omitted) Where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not show[n]-that the pleader is entitled to relief.
Estate of Ezra G. Smith, 509 Fed.Appx. at 439.
"Conclusory assertions, e.g., that... [the] defendants engaged in outrageous' and unlawful' behavior... are insufficient to state a claim that is plausible on its face." Ogle v. Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC, 513 Fed.Appx. 520, 522-523 (6th Cir. 2013). The "complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all material elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory." Bishop v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 520 F.3d 516, 519 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal citation omitted). As the Sixth Circuit stated in Bishop:
[c]onclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual allegations will not suffice. Even under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint containing a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion of a legally cognizable right of action is insufficient. (internal citations omitted) The factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief ...