Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Brown v. Chandler

United States District Court, Sixth Circuit

December 10, 2013

ADRIAN LAMAR BROWN, Plaintiff,
v.
LARRY CHANDLER, Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

THOMAS B. RUSSELL, Senior District Judge.

This matter is before the Court for screening of the pro se complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). For the reasons that follow, the Court will dismiss this action.

I.

Plaintiff filed this civil-rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Larry Chandler, the Chairman of the Kentucky Parole Board, in his official capacity.

According to the complaint, Plaintiff was interviewed by the Kentucky Parole Board on April 3, 2012, on his first appearance for both violent and non-violent offenses. The Parole Board deferred his parole for 48 months. He states that he later realized that the 48-month deferral was contrary to the law and that he should have been deferred 24 months on his consecutive, non-violent, Class C felony. He states that he wrote to Defendant about the error but Defendant saw no error or reason to reconsider the decision and informed Plaintiff that the law he relied on did not apply to him. He states that he exhausted his administrative remedies. He also states that he filed a declaratory judgment action in Franklin Circuit Court to which the Parole Board did not respond.

Plaintiff contends that his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection was violated because he was treated differently than others serving Class C felonies and that the Parole Board arbitrarily misapplied the law to him. He also states the 48-month deferral violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and violated Kentucky law.

As relief, Plaintiff seeks a "rehearing pursuant to KRS 439.340(14) towards Class C Felony."

II.

When a prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a governmental entity, officer, or employee, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any portion of it, if the court determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore, 114 F.3d at 604.

In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "[A] district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true." Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). "But the district court need not accept a bare assertion of legal conclusions.'" Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting Columbia Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995)). "A pleading that offers labels and conclusions' or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.' Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertion[s]' devoid of further factual enhancement.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).

III.

Due process claim

The relief Plaintiff seeks in this action is a rehearing before the Parole Board. "The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause protects persons against deprivations of life, liberty, or property; and those who seek to invoke its procedural protection must establish that one of these interests is at stake." Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). "Prisoners have no constitutional or inherent right' to parole or a parole hearing." Coleman v. Martin, 63 F.App'x 791, 792 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979)). Furthermore, the Commonwealth of Kentucky has not created a liberty interest in parole. See Ky. Rev. Stat. § 439.340(1). Instead, Kentucky considers the grant of parole a matter of "grace or gift" to persons deemed ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.