Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Berera v. Mesa Med. Group, LLC

United States District Court, E.D. Kentucky, Central Division

December 6, 2013

TAMMY BERERA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
v.
MESA MEDICAL GROUP, PLLC, Defendant

For Tammy Berera, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff: J. Dale Golden, Justin Peterson, LEAD ATTORNEYS, Golden & Walters PLLC, Lexington, KY.

For Mesa Medical Group, PLLC, Defendant: Daniel E. Danford, LEAD ATTORNEY, Stites & Harbison PLLC - Lexington, Lexington, KY; Marjorie Ann Farris, LEAD ATTORNEY, Stites & Harbison, PLLC - Louisville, Louisville, KY.

OPINION

Page 837

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Joseph M. Hood, Senior United States District Judge.

This matter is before the Court upon

Page 838

Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand. [D.E. 10].[1] This matter being fully briefed, and the Court being otherwise sufficiently advised, it is now ripe for review.

I. Procedural Background

Plaintiff Tammy Berera filed this suit in Fayette Circuit Court on June 25, 2013, asserting her claims " on behalf of all current and former employees of MESA and any predecessor company of MESA." [D.E. 1-1 at 5]. Berera asserted a violation of KRS 337.385, claiming Defendant did not pay the full amount of wages and overtime compensation earned, and a claim of negligence. [D.E. 1-1 at 6-7]. Berera then filed an amended complaint, incorporating the original complaint in full, and adding claims for conversion and punitive damages. [D.E. 1-1 at 35-36]. Berera filed a second amended complaint to add Katisha Kabalen as a member of the class. [D.E. 1-2 at 67].

Based on the Motions and other materials submitted to this Court, there has been much contention as to whether the claims asserted on the face of the complaint accurately encompass Plaintiffs' claims. A letter filed with the Court from Mr. Hunter Hughes, outside counsel for Defendant, memorializes a conversation with Plaintiffs' counsel, where Defendants attempted to discern the nature of Plaintiffs' claims. [D.E. 1-3]. Subsequently, the Fayette Circuit Court granted Defendant's Motion for a More Definite Statement. [D.E. 1-7 at 7]. Defendants contend that the federal nature of Plaintiffs' claims became apparent only after the parties' counsel met on August 26, 2013. [D.E. 1 at 4-5]. Defendant claims it was further evident that Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) taxes were in issue when it received Plaintiffs' Notice for Designated Representatives to Give Video Taped Deposition on August 29, 2013. [D.E. 13 at 8]. Defendant filed a Notice of Removal on September 11, 2013. [D.E. 1].

II. Standard of Review

" [A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 1441. " The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within 30 days after the receipt by the defendant through service or otherwise." Id. § 1446(b)(1). " If the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of removal may be filed within 30 days after receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable." Id. § 1446(b)(3).

" Only state-court actions that originally could have been filed in federal court may be removed to federal court by the defendant. . . . The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the 'well-pleaded complaint rule,' which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint." Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987) (citing Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112-13, 57 S.Ct. 96, 81 L.Ed. 70 (1936)).

Page 839

" [A] case may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense, including the defense of pre-emption." Id. at 393. However, " [o]n occasion, the Court has concluded that the pre-emptive force of a statute is so 'extraordinary' that it 'converts an ordinary state commonlaw complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule.'" Id. (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 95 L.Ed.2d 55 (1987)). " Once an area of state law has been completely pre-empted, any claim purportedly based on that pre-empted state law claim is considered, from its inception, a federal claim, and therefore arises under federal law." Id. (citing Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 24, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983)).

" The party seeking removal bears the burden of establishing its right thereto." Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of Ontario v. City of Detroit, 874 F.2d 332, 339 (6th Cir. 1989) (citing Wilson v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 257 U.S. 92, 97-98, 42 S.Ct. 35, 66 L.Ed. 144 (1921)). " The removal petition is to be ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.