This matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation [R. 39] filed by United States Magistrate Judge Hanly A. Ingram. The Report and Recommendation addresses the reported violation of a supervised release condition by the Defendant James Edward Fredrick. Judge Ingram recommends revocation, imprisonment for a term of 4 months, and renewed consideration of the re-imposition of supervised release. [R. 39, at 6.]
His Report advises the parties that any objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of service. [Id.] Fredrick did not file any objections and waived his right to allocution [R. 40]. Normally, when parties fail to object, this Court is not required to "review . . . a magistrate's factual or legal conclusions, under a de novo or any other standard . . . ." See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 151 (1985). Parties that do not object to a magistrate's report and recommendation are also barred from appealing a district court's order adopting that report and recommendation. United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
This Court has examined the record, and having made a de novo determination, it agrees with the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation. Nevertheless, in this situation where the actions of district court judges with respect to the imposition of supervised release conditions are heavily scrutinized, more attention must be paid to adopting this recommended disposition.
Fredrick was convicted and sentenced for failure to register as a sex offender in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a). Fredrick obtained sex offender status at the age of fifteen after he was convicted in 1991 of Aggravated Criminal Sexual Assault in Cook County Circuit Court, Chicago, Illinois. Upon his release from prison, his lifetime term of supervised release commenced on March 28, 2012. After violating a special term of his supervised release, the prohibition against consuming any alcoholic beverages, Fredrick now finds himself facing a prison sentence per Judge Ingram's recommendation.
Judge Ingram, however, astutely aware of the sensitivity surrounding the issue of supervised release conditions in the sex-offender context, did not make a specific recommendation as to continued application. Rather, he advises that the Court "consider the re-imposition of supervised release in connection with  review of the Recommended Disposition."
[R. 39, at 6.] Close scrutiny of these specific conditions is necessary where lifetime supervision is imposed in order to comply with the Sixth Circuit's instruction in United States v. Inman, 666 F.3d 1001 (6th Cir. 2012). There, the Sixth Circuit took issue with the imposition of six specific conditions of supervised release and concluded that this Court should reconsider their application: (1) the mandatory drug testing requirement; (2) the mandate to provide information about prescription medications; (3) the requirement that Probation have access to personal financial information; (4) the ban on consuming alcohol; (5) the prohibition on possessing or using technology with the capability of creating videos or picture; and (6) the bar on using a post office box or storage facility. Id. at 1005. All of these conditions were imposed on Fredrick at his sentencing for the underlying offense, and thus require renewed attention.
The following analysis is similar to that set forth in this Court's opinion in United States v. Inman, 08-127-GFVT [R. 84] (E.D. Ky. May 10, 2013). The imposition of supervised release conditions is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c). That section mandates that a court consider particular factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to determine whether a term of supervised release is warranted, and if a term is warranted, the amount of time that term should last and the conditions that should be applicable during that term. To comply with this mandate the court must consider:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed - (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner;
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for -- (A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines...;
(5) any pertinent policy statement - (A) issued by the Sentencing Commission...;
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.
See also United States V. Mayberry, 540 F.3d 506, 518 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing § 3553). In light of these factors and with due respect to Inman, this Court turns to addressing whether each specific special condition focused ...