MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Charles Baker filed this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 proceeding in forma pauperis.This matter is before the Court on the initial review of the second amended complaint (DN 30) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997).
Upon the initial review of the original and first amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court allowed Plaintiff's claims against "unknown corrections, jail and medical staff" for failure to protect and failure to provide medical treatment to proceed for further development. On October 7, 2011, the Court entered an Order giving Plaintiff 120 days to file a motion to amend the complaint to identify the unknown Defendants that he alleged should be held liable for failure to protect and failure to provide medical care. After receiving extensions of time due to issues related to service of subpoenas, on June 1, 2012, Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to add the names of six individuals he wished to sue. However, Plaintiff did not state any factual allegations against any of them. On August 2, 2012, the Court entered an Order directing Plaintiff to file a motion to amend his complaint and a proposed Second Amended Complaint stating factual allegations against each of the Defendants he wishes to sue and to tender completed summons forms for each Defendant. Plaintiff then filed the instant second amended complaint.
Plaintiff states that he is currently an inmate at the Northpoint Training Center. This action arises out of his previous incarceration at the Christian County Jail (CCJ). He sues the following employees of CCJ: James Pyle, Capt.; Trey Gilliland, Dep.; Mark Johnston, Dep.; Brad Woosley, Sgt.; Melissa Lancaster, LPN; four unknown members of the medical staff whom he identifies as nurses at CCJ; W. Campbell, Sgt.; and Wells, Sgt. He sues each of these Defendants in his or her official and individual capacities. Plaintiff also sues Ronald Miller, whom he identifies as a "detainee," and four "unknown detainees." Plaintiff sues each of the detainees in their individual capacities only.
Plaintiff states that on various dates he gave Defendants Pyle, Gilliland, Johnston, Woosley, Campbell, and Wells "notice" that he was going to be assaulted by several inmates in his housing unit. He states that these Defendants did nothing to protect him from an assault by another inmate, which occurred on October 11, 2010. He states that this was a violation of his First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. He states that the actions of Defendant Pyle were also a violation of his "right to the equal protection of the law."
Plaintiff states that he gave Defendant Lancaster notice that he had been assaulted on October 11, 2010. However, Defendant Lancaster "made no effort to examine the plaintiff to see if plaintiff had any seriouce injuries, after being notified by James Pyle, Capt." Plaintiff states that it was several days after the assault before he was examined by Defendant Lancaster. He states that he was denied proper medical treatment by Lancaster and the entire medical staff at the CCJ. Plaintiff states that such denial was a violation of his First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Plaintiff also states that four "Unknown Medical Staff" failed to provide him with proper medical care for his "serious injuries" after he was "violently assaulted by multiple detainees" violating his First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Miller physically assaulted him on October 11, 2010, because Miller stated that "'he hated any sex offender and its his job to teach them a leason, such as I am going to teach you.'" Plaintiff states that Defendant Miller "violated [his] civil rights just because the plaintiff was charged with a sex crime[.]" Plaintiff states this violated his First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments rights. Plaintiff makes essentially the same allegations against the four Defendant "Unknown Detainees."
As relief, Plaintiff seeks $2 million each in money and punitive damages.
When a prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a governmental entity, officer, or employee, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any portion of it, if the court determines that the complaint is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore, 114 F.3d at 604.
In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "[A] district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true." Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). "But the district court need not accept a 'bare assertion of legal conclusions.'" Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting Columbia Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995)). "A pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.' Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
Although this Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991), "[o]ur duty to be 'less stringent' with pro se complaints does not require us to conjure up unpled allegations." McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation omitted). And this Court is not required to create a claim for Plaintiff. Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975). To command otherwise would require the Court "to explore exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court from its legitimate ...