AMENDED MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
In 1733, when New York was still a British colony, John Peter Zenger began publishing a newspaper called the New York Weekly Journal. NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES 42 (2007). The periodical featured several articles and satirical cartoons criticizing the colonial Governor, who proved he was not amused by having Zenger arrested and put in prison on the basis of slander. Id. Though Zenger's supporters could have financed his release, he chose to remain in prison to both make a political statement as well as some additional profit from increased newspaper sales. Id. A rather sensational trial then ensued in which the Governor frequently used his considerable influence to tilt the scales of justice against Zenger. Id. at 43. However, standing between Zenger and the Crown were the common gentlemen of the jury, who rendered a verdict in favor of Zenger and protected the newspaper's rights to gather and report the news for society's benefit. Id. More than two and a half centuries later a newspaper comes before this Court in a case attracting significant media attention, requesting the removal of several provisions enacted to safeguard their old defender, the jury, who once stood up for the First Amendment rights the newspaper now seeks to invoke.
Though perhaps they do not risk the threats of the 18th Century, even today we expect a great deal from jurors. We command their presence, require that they rearrange their schedules, sometimes for days or weeks, and then ask that they make dramatic choices about the lives of others that can leave the jurors weeping after a difficult verdict rendered late into the evening.
Not surprisingly, courts have traditionally looked for ways to support jurors in their work while protecting the integrity of the jury process. One of the ways both federal judicial districts in Kentucky attempt to accomplish this is by limiting interaction with jurors "before, during or after trial" unless allowed by the court. LCrR 24.1(a). Another method utilized in the Eastern District of Kentucky is restricting access to juror information. General Order 08-13, Jury Plan § 9.1. The Lexington Herald-Leader, Lexington, Kentucky's only daily newspaper, seeks to intervene in this case, the nation's first prosecution of a hate crime on the basis of sexual orientation, to challenge these rules. [R. 149; R. 156]. In sweeping motions, the newspaper asks that both rules be found unconstitutional as applied to the press. It says, the First Amendment and its provision ensuring press freedom demands this result.
LCrR 24.1(a) is good rule but, as explained below, the court is not aware of any instance in which it has been read to prohibit a newspaper reporter from speaking to a willing juror. The reason is the one urged by the Herald-Leader -- such an application would generally violate the First Amendment. The rule, however, does not. Additionally, as a corollary to that rule, the district court must be permitted to disclose some information about willing jurors to facilitate this media access. However, this Court does not read General Order 08-13 or Jury Plan § 9.1 to constrain the power of the district court to release the names of willing jurors upon the request of the press when no sufficient countervailing reasons exist to justify impounding them. For these reasons this Court finds that neither General Order 08-13, nor Jury Plan § 9.1, nor LCrR 24.1(a) should be applied to restrict access to willing juror information or to bar the Herald-Leader from contacting willing jurors following the verdict in United States v. Jenkins. Therefore, this Court grants the Herald-Leader the access it seeks in this case, but refuses to go so far as to deem either rule constitutionally infirm.
As an initial matter, the Court must decide a matter of jurisdiction, whether the Lexington Herald-Leader has any right or ability to appear in this prosecution. The Herald-Leader has styled its petition to this Court in part as a "Motion to Intervene." [R. 149]. The Sixth Circuit has recognized that unlike civil cases, "no mechanism exists for a private citizen to intervene in a criminal case." United States v. Perry, 360 F.3d 519, 532 n.10 (6th Cir. 2004). Therefore, formal intervention for the Lexington Herald-Leader is not appropriate.*fn1 However, this does not end the analysis.
In the same footnote in which the Sixth Circuit noted that no mechanism existed for private party intervention into a criminal case, it recognized that "we have not always required intervention." Id. As an example of this proposition, the Sixth Circuit cited CBS Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234, 237 (6th Cir. 1975), which is a case concerning an issue substantially similar to the one raised by the Herald-Leader. In that case, the Sixth Circuit allowed a news organization to appeal a gag order issued by a judge even though that news organization was "neither a party to the litigation nor specifically enjoined by the order from discussing the case." Id. Therefore,
In CBS Inc., the Sixth Circuit also makes clear that the media has standing to bring their claim under these circumstances. Specifically, the Sixth Circuit found that the fact that the news organization was not a party in the litigation does not mean it did not suffer injury, as the organization's "ability to gather the news concerning the trial is directly impaired or curtailed." Id. at 237-38. Implicit in this analysis is the recognition that the gag order of the judge caused this injury and a court order overturning that gag order would redress this harm, satisfying constitutional standing requirements. Similarly, the Sixth Circuit found that the news organization's claim satisfied the prudential standing requirements as the gag order, "denying to the petitioner access to potential sources of information, at least arguably impairs the rights guaranteed to the petitioner by the First Amendment." Id. at 237. According to the court, this made the interest of the news organization "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question." Id.
By the same rationale, as a direct result of LCrR 24.1(a) the Herald-Leader's ability to gather the news surrounding the Jenkins trial has been impaired. This injury would be redressed by an order of this Court. Further, limitations on gathering the news affects a right that is "arguably within the zone of interests" to be protected by the First Amendment." Id. Therefore, the Herald-Leader has both constitutional and prudential standing to bring its claim before this Court.
This result should come as no surprise as LCrR 24.1(a) expressly contemplates and provides for such an appearance. The text of rule states that "unless permitted by the Court" no person, party, or attorney can communicate with a jury. Implicit in this language is the notion that someone who was not a party or attorney in an action could rightfully appear before the court and petition for permission to contact the jury that had been empanelled and rendered a verdict in that particular case. As a result, the Herald-Leader has standing.
The Herald-Leader claims that LCrR 24.1(a) is an unconstitutional burden of the freedom of the press. In full, LCrR 24.1(a) states that, "Unless permitted by the Court, no person, party or attorney, nor any representative of a party or attorney may contact, interview, or communicate with any juror before, during or after trial." The purpose of this rule is not to stifle the media or create some insidious barrier to their gathering of the news related to federal court proceedings. Instead, this rule is a mere extension of the privacy provided jurors during their deliberations.
For important reasons, jurors consider evidence and deliver verdicts in courtrooms open to the public, but have historically deliberated in private and received a measure of confidentiality once their work is done. Daniel Aaron, The First Amendment and Post-Verdict Interviews, 20 Colum. J.L. & Social Problems 203, 203 n. 228 (1986). Dating back to the Fourteenth Century, the courts of England endeavored to devise strategies to protect against corruption and intimidation of the jury. Id. "As early as 1354, Parliament is petitioned to compel all evidence to be brought to the bar and allow no one access to the jury afterward." Id. (citing M. RADIN, HANDBOOK OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 215 (1936)). Blackstone described the jury as being, "delivered from confinement" to give their verdict to the judge. Id. (citing 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *377 (1768)). So jealously guarded from
potential outside interference were the juries of the past that Steinhook described them as being, "shut up famished as captives, with no one intruding, until they had absolved or condemned." Id. (citing STEINHOOK, DE JURE SUEONUM ET GOTHORUM, HOLMIAE (1672)).
Within the walls of the jury room, the jurors must be able to expel from their minds external concerns and apply the facts as they see them to the law given by the judge. If during that sacred time jurors must worry that the fair and impartial decision they make in the jury room will lead to harassment and molestation from the parties, the attorneys, or others when they leave it, a major blow is dealt to the administration of justice. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 553 (1976) ("Due process requires that the accused receive a trial by an impartial jury free from outside influences.strong measures must be taken by the trial court to ensure that the balance is never weighed against the accused.").
The rule not only safeguards the administration of justice, but also protects the safety of jurors themselves. In this case, for example, the defendants were convicted of very serious crimes and readily admitted to engaging in a physical altercation with the victim. Also, as a function of the defendants' acquittal in the nation's first prosecution of a hate crime based on sexual orientation, the local government has received a communication from a gay and lesbian advocacy group that several thousand of their members intend to protest at the courthouse during the sentencing of the defendants. LCrR 24.1(a) operates as a proactive protective measure to help ensure that after the jurors complete their public service, they will not find themselves to be the next victim of violence or their homes to be the next gathering place for thousands of protesters following the sentencing proceeding.
However, even the weighty interest of society in the fair administration of justice and protection of jurors has limits. Newsgathering is an activity that is protected by the First Amendment. Boddie v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 881 F.2d 267, 271 (6th Cir. 1989) (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972)). This is because, "without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated." Id. (citing Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 (1980)).
The Sixth Circuit has applied these principles to find that a "post-trial judicial gag order.would trammel first amendment values and fail to pass constitutional muster." In re Memphis Pub. Co., 887 F.2d 646, 649 (6th Cir. 1989). Further, the Sixth Circuit has found that in certain cases gag orders constitute prior direct restraints by the government upon First Amendment freedoms of expression and speech. CBS Inc., 522 F.2d at 238. As such, they are subject to the closest scrutiny and there is a heavy presumption against their constitutional validity. Id. (citing Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)). Before such an order restricting speech can be upheld there must be, "a serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice. Id. (quoting Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 373 (1947)).
The Herald-Leader states that not only is LCrR 24.1(a) comparable to the gag order forbidden in CBS Inc., but "is more restrictive and less justifiable." [R. 149 at 4]. And while this might be true of a specific order of this Court restricting post-verdict jury access under these circumstances, the LCrR 24.1(a) itself is distinct from a gag order. In CBS Inc., the trial judge entered a full gag order stating as follows:
For good cause appearing, it is ORDERED that in addition to all counsel and Court personnel, all parties concerned with this litigation, whether plaintiffs or defendants, their relatives, close friends, and associates are hereby ORDERED to refrain from discussing in any manner whatsoever these cases with members of the news media or the public.
CBS Inc., 522 F.2d at 236. Specifically, the court characterized the order by stating, "in sweeping terms it seals the lips of all parties concerned with the litigation," effectively removing the significant sources the press could use to gather the news. Id at 238.
LCrR 24.1(a) does not sweep so broadly. Instead, its reach is far less than the CBS Inc. gag order. Where that prohibition concerned the speech of nearly everyone involved in the litigation, LCrR 24.1(a) concerns media access only to jurors. As a practical matter, this is a significant difference. The media coverage of the Jenkins trial, for example, was robust throughout the proceeding. Several reporters attended the trial daily and provided the public with frequent updates concerning the happenings of the courtroom. Following trial, many news outlets contacted representatives of the parties and received comment from the defense as well as from the United States Department of Justice on the case.
Further, unlike the gag order in CBS Inc., even the preliminary restrictions of LCrR 24.1(a) do not permanently seal the lips of the jurors without exception. This Court did not set forth a blanket order that the jurors were not to speak with the media, nor does LCrR 24.1(a) represent such a general prohibition. *fn2 Instead, the rule expressly empowers the trial court to provide media access to jurors upon the petition of an interested news organization. In this way the rule does not erect an impenetrable wall of partition between the jury and the media, it simply provides for an intermediate step that the press must take before contacting jurors. And this step is not onerous. In the context of post-trial juror contact by the media, this requirement is read by this Court not as a substantive prior restraint, but as merely an administrative procedure to allow the court to ensure that other ...